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WHITENESS AND REMEDY:
UNDER-RULING CIVIL RIGHTS IN
WALKER V. CITY OF MESQUITE
Martha R Mahoneyt
INTRODUCT[ON
Teenagers quote "rules" on how fictional characters survive hor-
ror movies: "Never have sex. (Virgins always live.) ... Never say, 'I'll
be right back.'"' Another rule predicts the fate of black characters in
action films: "The brother always dies first."2 Unsurprisingly, these
movie "rules" reflect racist and sexist attitudes in American culture.
This Article criticizes a trend in recent cases protecting white plain-
tiffs3 and argues that courts must not develop "rules" protecting white-
ness as a core concern of the requirement that race-conscious
remedies for racial discrimination be narrowly tailored. Since early
1987, white plaintiffs have almost never lost on the merits4 in the
t Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I am grateful to Ken
Casebeer, Donna CokerJohn Ely, Marc Fajer, Darren Hutchinson, Joan Mahoney, Stepha-
nie Wildman, and especially to Florence Roisman for suggestions and comments, to
Martha Fineman and the participants in the Symposium on Discrimination and Inequality
at Cornell Law School, to Michelle Williams and Sasha Abele for research assistance, and
to the University of Miami School of Law for summer research support.
1 ScREAM (Dimension Files 1996).
2 See, e.g., Roger Ebert, Action with an Edge: Mamet's Script Winks at Movie Cliches, CHI.
SuN-TiuMs, Sept. 26, 1997, at 37 (referring to "the BADF [Brother Always Dies First] action
movie rule").
3 Michael Fischl summed up the 1989 Supreme Court term tersely: "White men win."
Richard Michael Fischl, Job Bias Barrage, LEGAL TiMEs, Aug. 7, 1989, at S12. A broad study
of all cases to which the Supreme Court denied certiorari during the same period I de-
scribe herein would be necessary to determine with certainty whether the Court's overall
pattern is to consistently deny review in cases that undermined civil rights rulings, and such
a study is beyond the scope of this Article. Interestingly, in two recent cases involving
whites and civil rights remedies in which the Court denied certiorari, whites won in Walker
v. City of Mesquite, 181 F.3d 98 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 181 F.3d 98 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 129 S.Ct. 969 (2000) ("Walker 1"), but lost in McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d
1219 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 981 (1998). In McNamara, Judge Richard Posner said
narrow tailoring required "as a practical matter" that the remedy "discriminates against
whites as little as possible consistent with effective remediation," 138 F.3d at 1222, but
upheld a race-based promotions remedy. See infra text accompanying note 239. The dan-
ger with which I am concerned is that the standards applied in Walker, similar to the stan-
dard articulated in McNamara, treat protection of whites or whiteness as a core concern of
"narrow tailoring" analysis.
4 There are four cases that could arguably be called departures from this "rule" in
which white plaintiffs did not win outright, but they were not losses on the merits. See
Texas v. Lesage, 120 S. Ct. 467 (1999) (per curiam); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541
(1999); Lawyer v. DOJ, 521 U.S. 567 (1997); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
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Supreme Court when challenging structural gains by minorities.5 In
Walker v. City of Mesquite ("Walker V"),6 the Fifth Circuit held that white
homeowners have a constitutional right not to have their neighbor-
hoods selected on the basis of their whiteness for remedying intransi-
gent and longstanding discrimination against black public housing
tenants which included exclusion from white neighborhoods. Although the
Supreme Court has previously treated the project of remedying racial
discrimination as a compelling interest justifying the use of race, it
denied certiorari.7 I call this "under-ruling": the court permits the
undermining of constitutional protection for people of color and in-
vites the destruction of its own doctrine. Like movie "rules" that re-
flect contemporary prejudice, under-ruling civil rights reflects and
preserves white privilege.
Critical theorists know that "the master's tools will never dismantle the
master's house."8 Critical race theory (CRT) developed new theoretical
tools that permit harm to be identified more clearly and remedy to be
constructed with greater specificity. Those tools are applied in this
Article to questions of remedy for proven unconstitutional racial seg-
regation in public housing. In this context, the "master's house" is
not literal-though mansions built with the profits of slavery still dot
the southern countryside-but a symbol for the construction of white
housing in a metropolitan economy and geography built on white
privilege and black subordination. In Walker V, the Fifth Circuit held
that, after years of resistance by defendants to the implementation of
voluntary agreements and remedial orders, white homeowners could
still block a federal court's order to build two small apartment com-
plexes in white neighborhoods.9 In Texas, through the under-ruling
process, it is now purportedly unconstitutional to dismantle the
master's house with any tools at all.
The closest to a true loss on the merits was Texas v. Lesage; the Lesage Court held that a
white applicant, who was "an African immigrant of Caucasian descent," Lesage, 120 S. Ct. at
467, was not treated unfairly by the admissions process of the University of Texas, even
though the university considered race when admitting students, see id. at 467-69. For a
discussion of winning and losing claims by white plaintiffs, see infra Part IVA
5 I would include in this category challenges to voting districts or challenges to pro-
grams considering race in the award of government contracts, for example, but would
exclude cases in which white plaintiffs allege individual claims of race discrimination by a
particular actor rather than by policy, see, e.g.,Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701
(1989) (holding that, where a white football coach alleged reassignment based on his race
but did not challenge structures or practices in school district as favoring minorities, the
municipality and school district were not vicariously liable for discrimination). I do not
consider cases brought by minorities rather than by white plaintiffs or intervenors.
6 169 F.3d 973 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 181 F.3d 98 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct 969 (2000).
7 See Walker v. City of Mesquite, 120 S.Ct. 969 (2000).
8 AuDPE LORDE, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SIsTER/
OUTSIDER 110, 112 (1984).
9 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 987.
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Segregation in public housing is only one part of metropolitan
racial segregation, but it is uniquely important. It is supported by
state action'0 and affects low-income people who have little choice
about where to live and are vulnerable to the linkage of poverty with
the concentration of minorities. Lawsuits challenging public housing
segregation are ponderous and last for years. Remedies seldom reach
far enough to address the large structures of segregation; public hous-
ing segregation is deeply embedded in metropolitan patterns of ine-
quality that also include schools and public services.
Oddly, because of the way the idea of "race" occurs in American
social and legal discourse, courts and commentators often seemed to
perceive the harm of segregation as too great a concentration of mi-
noriies"l-in the framework of many public housing cases, too much
10 See, e.g., Elizabeth M Julian & Michael M. Daniel, Separate and UnequaL" The Root and
Branch of Public Housing Segregation, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE Rxv. 666, 668 (1989). Ms. Julian
and Mr. Daniel noted:
The state-initiated, -supported, and -maintained residential separation of
whites and African-Americans allows a number of basic discriminatory deci-
sions to be made and implemented without actually confronting the stag-
gering conflict between the values of freedom and equality to which we
have subscribed as a nation and the realities of a system in which whites
benefit from the deprivation of African-Americans.
Id.
11 This reflects a common approach to housing segregation in the literature on urban
development. For example, the term "racially impacted" is routinely used to describe
neighborhoods that are predominantly African American; areas that are predominantly
white are called "non-impacted." See, e.g., Florence Wagman Roisman & Philip Tegeler,
Improving and Expanding Housing Opportunities for Poor People of Color: Recent Developments in
Federal and State Courts, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 312, 332 (1990) (describing 1987 consent
decree in the Walker case in which the Dallas Housing Authority agreed "to construct 100
units of low-rent public housing in 'non-racially impacted areas'"); Michael H. Schill, Priva-
tizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing 75 CORNELL L. REV.
878, 911-12 (1990) (using term "non-racially impacted" as synonymous with "non-minor-
ity"); see alsoJackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1531 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994) (explain-
ing "racially impacted" as meaning that "that the percentage of persons of a particular
race living in a racially impacted area exceeds twice the percentage living in the county,"
(emphasis added), but then using the term to refer to a mostly-African-American census
tract but not a larger, majority white area). Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton treat "seg-
regation" and "ghettoization" as virtually interchangeable terms. See, e.g., DOUGLAS MASSEY
& NANcy DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS
9 (1993) ("Our fundamental argument is that racial segregation-and its characteristic in-
stitutional form, the black ghetto-are the key structural factors responsible for the perpet-
uation of black poverty in the United States.").
John Calmore is the main theorist who has criticized this approach. His argument
emphasizes "spatial equality" for black communities. SeeJohn 0. Calmore, Fair Housing vs.
Fair Housing: The Problems with Providing Increased Housing Opportunities Through Spatial
Deconcentration, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 7 (1980) [hereinafter Calmore, Fair Housing] (call-
ing for new housing to be built in black communities and criticizing regulations of the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development that discourage such new construction);
John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a Stone of Hope from a
Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1233 (1995) [hereinafter Calmore, Racialized Space]
(criticizing Douglas Massey's emphasis on crime as an ideological drift to the right because
it provides support for a politically right agenda);John 0. Calmore, SpatialEquality and the
20001 1311
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
blackness. 12 Rather than allowing whiteness to remain an invisible
dominant norn, critical race theory reveals whiteness and blackness
to be parts of the same social construction. Inner city racial concen-
tration and suburban racial exclusion are the obverse sides of the coin
of segregation. Treating both exclusionary privileged whiteness and
subordinated concentrated blackness as problems resolves theoretical
tensions in housing desegregation remedies between equalization of
conditions for residents of public housing and mobility for those ten-
ants within metropolitan areas.' 3 It also permits the tailoring of reme-
Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-the-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1487, 1491-92 (1993)
[hereinafter Calmore, Spatial Equality] (criticizing deconcentration and recommending a
blended approach incorporating integration, but with emphasis on community enrich-
ment); see also Michael R. Tein, Comment, The Devaluation of Nonwhite Community in Reme-
dies for Subsidized Housing Discrimination, U. PA. L. REv. 463, 463 (1992) (arguing that
"judicial treatment of discrimination in subsidized housing has not accorded proper re-
spect to nonwhite community as a legitimate entity").
12 The framework of Walker Vprotects "whiteness" against desegregatory moves involv-
ing black public housing tenants. This "white over black" paradigm, Elizabeth M. Iglesias,
Out of the Shadow: Marking Intersections in and Between Asian Pacific American Critical Legal
Scholarship and Latinalo Critical Legal Theory, 40 B.C. L. REv. 349 (1998), is implicit in the
court's approach even though Latino communities are eventually mentioned as well.
Many scholars in recent years have discussed the "paradigm" that analyzes race in terms of
blackness and whiteness. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi's Real "Messy"
World of Race: An Essay for "Naked People Longing to Swim Free," 15 L. & INzQuAmY J. 25
(1997); Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby---Lat~rit The-
ory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1585 (1997); Juan F. Perea, The Black/White
Binary Paradigm of Race: The Normal Science of American Racial Though 85 CAL. L. Rzv. 1213
(1997); Janine Young Kim, Note, Are Asians Black?: The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda
and the Contemporary Significance of the Black/White Paradigm, 108 YALE L.J. 2385 (1999). In
this Article, the "whiteness" was the subject of the court's explicit protection, and the
"blackness" was the genesis of the plaintiff class of black residents in public housing. The
core question is whether whiteness will be protected against remedial orders that will place
black housing tenants in white neighborhoods; the Walker Vcourt points to Latino commu-
nities as an example of alternative locations for public housing so that whiteness need not
be a classification it must use. See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 987.
13 See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Separate and [UnlEqual: Housing Choice, Mobility, and Equali-
zation in the Federally Subsidized HousingProgram, 71 TUL L. Rzv. 413, 419 (1996). Professor
Adams noted:
In a sense, these two approaches [emphasizing equality and integration]
are part of a dialectical exchange that has preoccupied many members of
the black community for generations. Remedies for systemic housing dis-
crimination against low-income black Americans must be responsive to the
needs of the black community and yet, at the same time, build upon the
jurisprudence and doctrine that has developed within the integration ideal.
Id. (footnote omitted). The first article on mobility remedies and a thorough review of all
mobility plans at the time is Florence Wagman Roisman & Hilary Botein, Housing Mobility
and Life Opportunities, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 335 (1993); see also Florence Wagman Rois-
man, The Lessons of American Apartheid: The Necessity and Means of Promoting Residential
Racial Integration, 81 IowA L. Rzv. 479 (1995) (reviewing DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993));
Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 11 (reviewing remedies in cases brought under federal
law). But cf. Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CSS.-KENT L. REv. 795
(1991) (arguing for deconcentration strategies over enrichment strategies); David Blair-
Loy, Comment, A Time to PullDown, and a Time to Build Up: The Constitutionality of Rebuilding
1312 [Vol. 85:1309
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dies with great precision to circumstances of tenants and the harms of
segregation.
Part I of this Article discusses segregation in public housing, Sec-
tion 8 programs that provide housing assistance through certificates
and touches, and the Walker litigation. Part II reviews insights from
critical race theory that are particularly helpful in analyzing questions
of segregation in public housing, emphasizing the social construction
of whiteness as a transparent, dominant norm. Because whiteness
feels natural and neutral to white people, interference with whiteness
may seem intrusive, while the maintenance of whiteness may seem un-
noticeable. Part HI applies these theories to remedies for public hous-
ing segregation.
Part IV examines questions of race and remedy in Supreme Court
precedents and in the recent Fifth Circuit opinion in Walker V, empha-
sizing the way the Walker court treated the issue of narrow tailoring in
race-conscious remedies.' 4 The Walker Vpanel made two crucial mis-
takes on this question. First, it held that narrow tailoring required
that race-neutral measures must not only be considered, but must be
adopted in preference to race-conscious measures if they could pro-
vide a remedy, ignoring the district court's findings that certain race-
conscious measures were necessary for remedy.' 5 Under this ap-
proach, the second prong of the Supreme Court's approach-narrow
tailoring-undermines the first prong-the justification of the use of
race by showing a compelling government interest. Using race there-
fore really means "not" using race-a contradiction that critical race
theory explains as a paradigmatically white perspective on race.' 6 Sec-
ond, when considering the award of relief to plaintiffs and the ques-
tion of locations for remedial housing, the Fifth Circuit
misunderstood the meaning of the term "race-neutral;" it proposed
remedial alternatives that were in fact race-conscious but nonetheless
refused to allow white neighborhoods to be selected for remedial con-
struction.' 7 I argue that these concepts are not only doctrinally wrong
but also constitutionalize a typically white viewpoint regarding race
and neutrality.
Illegally Segregated Public Housing, 88 Nw. U. L. Riv. 1537, 1557-67 (1994) (arguing that it is
unconstitutional to rebuild segregated public housing unless rebuilding promotes
desegregation).
14 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
15 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 9833.
16 See, e.g., Calmore, supra note 12, at 70 ("[C]olorblindness is a white paradigm, not
really colorblind at all.").
17 See infra notes 242-44.
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I
WALKE V Cr OF MESQ UTE AND
PuBLic HOUSING SEGREGATION
A. Racial Segregation in Subsidized Housing Programs
Public housing in America has historically been racially segre-
gated.18 Public housing for senior citizens is generally more white
than family public housing.19 The Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) helped create segregated conditions and its ac-
tions exacerbated segregation.20 Professor Roisman notes that " [t]he
few desegregative steps HUD has taken generally have been motivated
by civil rights suits filed against the Department."21 It is common for
desegregation cases to take many years, 22 and it is not unusual for
defendants to resist compliance with remedial orders.23
18 See MODIBO COULBALY ET AL., SEGREGATION IN FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED LOW-INCOME
HoUsING IN THE UNITED STATES passim (1998);JOHN GOERING Er AL., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous.
& URBAN DEv., THE LOCATION AND RACIAL COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RACIAL. OCCUPANCY AND LOCATION OF PUBLIC HOUSING DEVEL-
oPMENrs 6 (1994); Florence Wagman Roisman, Intentional RacialDiscrimination and Segrega-
tion by the Federal Government as a Principal Cause of Concentrated Poverty: A Response to Schill
and Wachter, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1351 (1995) [hereinafter Roisman, Intentional Racial Dis-
crimination]; Florence Wagman Roisman, Long Overdue: Desegregation Litigation and Next
Steps to End Discrimination and Segregation in the Public Housing and Section 8 Existing Housing
Programs, 4 CI1YsCAPE 171, 171 (1999) [hereinafter Roisman, Long Overdue] (citing HUD's
acknowledgment of "the existence of 'a profoundly disturbing pattern of racial disparities
within the public housing system'"). For a general discussion on discrimination in hous-
ing, see generally CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN
AMERICA (Michael Fix & RaymondJ. Struyk eds., 1992) and HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND
FEDERAL POLICY (John M. Goering ed., 1986).
19 HUD reported in 1994 that "[f]amily developments are predominantly African
American, while elderly developments are largely white." GOERING Er AL., supra note 18, at
2. It further reported:
In family developments, 20 percent of heads of households are white, 64
percent African American, 13 percent Hispanic, and 2 percent Asian.
Although only 34 percent of all households in public housing develop-
ments reside in elderly developments, they constitute 52 percent of all
whites in public housing developments. In elderly developments, heads of
household are 55 percent white, 35 percent African American, 8 percent
Hispanic, and 2 percent Asian.
Id.
20 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 186-216.
21 Roisman, Long Overdue, supra note 18, at 172.
22 See, e.g., Davis v. New York City Hous. Auth., 166 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1998), remanded
to 60 F. Supp. 2d 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (desegregation case still in litigation in 2000 despite a
consent decree signed in 1992); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 4 F. Supp. 2d 575
(N.D. 111. 1998) (the most recent decision in desegregation case begun in the 1960s).
Many authors have written about the Gautreaux remedial work. See, e.g., Janet Koven Levit,
Rewtriting Beginnings: The Lessons of Gautreaux, 28J. MARsHALL L. REV. 57 (1994); Leonard
S. Rubinowitz, Metropolitan Public Housing Desegregation Remedies: Chicago's Privatization Pro-
gram, 12 N. ILL. L. REv. 589 (1992).
23 Litigation resulting from school and housing segregation in Yonkers, NewYork has
been one of most egregious examples. Initiated in 1980, see Spallone v. United States, 493
U.S. 265, 268 (1990), the first remedial order in the case was issued in 1986. See id. The
1314 [Vol. 85:1309
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Section 8 of the Low-Income Housing Act provides certificates or
vouchers for tenants to pay for units in the private housing market.24
Section 8 can be used to integrate assisted tenants into middle-income
neighborhoods.25 Section 8 has been used as a method of remedying
racial segregation in assisted housing.2 6 However, there are persistent
problems with Section 8 certificate programs which often reproduce
racial concentration.2 7 Section 8 certificate holders encounter private
sector discrimination; they also experience difficulties in the private
city's continued resistance caused the district court to impose heavy fines on the city, which
the Supreme Court upheld, see id. at 276, and fines for individual contempt against individ-
ual city council members for failure to vote in favor of a remedial ordinance. The Court
found the district court abused its discretion in light of the reasonable probability that
contempt sanctions against the city alone would have succeeded; only if that approach
failed to produce compliance should individual sanctions have been considered. See id. at
280. The Yonkers case was still in litigation in the late 1990s. See United States v. City of
Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, NewYork v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 521 U.S.
1104 (1997); on remand to United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 992 F. Supp. 672
(S.D.N.Y.), modified, 30 F. Supp. 2d 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437-1437aaa-8 (1994); see also CouvBALY Er AL., supra note 18, at 35
(describing the Section 8 Housing Assistance Program, "currently the largest source of
subsidized low-income housing in the country," which provides assistance to low- and mod-
erate-income families through four subprograms-New Construction, Substantial Rehabili-
tation, Moderate Rehabilitation, and Existing Housing-but falls far short of meeting the
demand for assisted housing units). The existing housing program based on certificates
and vouchers is the program at issue in Walker and other desegregation cases.
25 Of course, homeowners in those neighborhoods receive significant government
subsidies themselves: the deduction from income subject to federal tax of interest paid on
loans for private home purchases and property taxes paid to local governments. John
Charles Boger proposes national Fair Share legislation that would facilitate desegregation,
including measures to
modify the federal tax code so that property holders in municipalities that
choose to ignore their prescribed housing goals would progressively lose
their mortgage interest and property tax deductions. These tax code modi-
fications would have a dual purpose: First, to prompt citizens to encourage
municipalities to comply with federal law, thereby hastening metropolitan
integration; second, to reverse the economic advantages that currently flow
toward property holders in segregated communities.
John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal for the Next
Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1573, 1574 (1993).
26 See Roisman & Botein, supra note 13, at 335; see also Richard H. Sander, Comment,
Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 874,
928-30 (1988) (advocating certificates and vouchers ("mobility grants") as a means of
achieving desegregation).
27 For recent literature exploring and critically evaluating possibilities for successful
use of Section 8 in desegregation programs, see Corinne Anne Carey, The Need for Commu-
niy-Based Housing Development in Integration Efforts, 7J. ArrORDABE HOUSING & COMMUN n
Div. L. 85 (1997); W. David Koeninger, A Room of One's Own and Five Hundred Pounds
Becomes a Piece of Paper and "Get a job": Evaluating Changes in Public Housing Policy from a
Feminist Perspective, 16 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 445, 463-74 (1997); Kim Johnson-Spratt,
Note, Housing Discrimination and Source of Income: A Tenant's Losing Battle, 32 Im. L. REv.
457 (1999); Mark A. Malaspina, Note, Demanding the Best: How to Restructure the Section 8
Household-Based Rental Assistance Program, 14 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 287 (1996).
20001 1315
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
sector such as higher security deposits.2 8 HUD reduced its "fair mar-
ket rent" calculation in 1995; even before that, HUD's fair market rent
payments were insufficient to make housing in many white neighbor-
hoods affordable.29 Therefore, despite the fact that Section 8 certifi-
cates are sought by many tenants currently in public housing, 0
certificates may reproduce residential segregation unless they are
combined with race-conscious programs. 31
B. A Brief History of the Walker Litigation
Dallas and the Dallas Housing Authority (DHA) built all family
public housing in minority areas of Dallas.32 Between 1955 and 1989,
Dallas built no new public housing because the housing projects
might have had to be placed in white areas. 33 Tenant selection
and assignment plans were "crafted and administered to maintain
racially segregated projects," 34 and "Section 8 [certificate and vouch-
er] housing programs were operated to discourage blacks from
moving into white areas of metropolitan Dallas."35 For decades,
African Americans were purposefully confined by state, local, and
federal actions to existing housing in "minority areas" or pre-
dominantly black housing projects in "minority areas." 6 The enor-
28 For a comprehensive discussion of current problems experienced by Section 8 ten-
ants, see NEv YORK STATE ADVISORY Comm. TO THE U.S. Comm. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL
HOUSING OPPORTUNmTES IN NEv YoRK: AN EVALUATION OF SECTION 8 HOUSING PROGRAMS IN
BUFFALO, ROCHESTER, AND SYRACUSE 11-13 (1999) (noting as barriers to Section 8 mobility
residency preferences, inadequate public transportation, failure of Section 8 administra-
tors to share listings with each other and with community groups, security deposits, multi-
ple applications for different housing programs, lack of mobility counseling, and
discrimination).
29 See Roisman, Long Overde supra note 18, at 174.
30 See Philip D. Tegeler et al., Transforming Section 8. Using Federal Housing Subsidies to
Promote Individual Housing Choice and Desegregation, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 451, 453
(1995).
31 Obviously, these certificates can be used to move to minority middle-class neigh-
borhoods as well as to white neighborhoods, so that they may provide a variety of housing
choices for tenants. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
32 SeeWalker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 976 (5th Cir.), reh'gdenied, 181 F.3d 98
(5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 969 (2000).
33 See id. The Fifth Circuit called the history of public housing in Dallas "a sordid tale
of overt and covert racial discrimination and segregation." Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
86 Id. The Walker V court contrasted the term "minority areas" with "white areas"
when describing the history of public housing in Dallas. Id. at 976. Latinos were subject
to discrimination in public housing in Dallas as well: just as the West Dallas project was
originally built to "solve the Negro housing problem," Walker v. United States HUD, 734 F.
Supp. 1289, 1296 (N.D. Tex. 1989) ("Walker II), vacated and remanded, 912 F.2d 819 (5th
Cir. 1990), the city had originally built separate projects for "Mexicans" or "Latin-Ameri-
cans." Id. In 1965, the city had two "Mexican" projects; by 1974, the West Dallas projects
that had been white or Latino had become mostly black but, in a different part of the city,
the "Little Mexico" project still remained 100% Latino. Id.
1316 [Vol. 85:1309
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mous West Dallas project was "'a gigantic monument to segregation and
neglect.' ,,37
The Walker case began when black plaintiffs sued in 1985 over
race discrimination in the public housing and Section 8 programs in
Dallas and its suburbs.38 In 1987, a consent decree required the crea-
tion of new public housing opportunities in predominantly white ar-
eas of the city.8 9 The defendants also agreed to develop a
nondiscriminatory tenant selection and assignment plan and to use
Section 8 existing housing support for "mobility"-to assist black fami-
lies in locating housing in predominantly white areas.40 After the de-
fendants resisted implementation of the plan and violated the
agreements, in 1992 a district judge vacated the decree and granted
summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue of liability.41 A trial
on the question of remedy was held in 1994,42 and remedial orders
were entered against the DHA and HUD in 1995 and 1996.43 HUD
was ordered to demolish most of the huge West Dallas project44 and
to replace 2807 demolished units by developing replacements
through Section 8 certificates and construction of new units.45
The district court held a hearing on the efficacy of the Section 8
program and found that it alone would not be an adequate remedy
for various reasons: a lack of three- and four-bedroom units, unavaila-
bility of Section 8 units and disinterest of landlords in renting to Sec-
tion 8 tenants in mostly white areas, disparity between HUD's fair
market rent and the cost of available units, and tenant frustration with
seeking units in white areas, which led to tenants remaining in minor-
ity areas.46 Also, some members of the plaintiff class preferred living
in a unit owned and operated by DHA to finding a unit on their
own. 47 The court found that Section 8 certificates and vouchers must
37 Walker M, 734 F. Supp. at 1306 (quoting the 1987 letter to the district court from
two Dallas city council members).
8 See Walker v. United States HUD, 734 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (N.D. Tex. 1989)
("Walker "), vacated and remanded, 912 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1999). The plaintiffs sued subur-
ban cities for failure to participate in the Section 8 program. See id. HUD and the Dallas
Housing Authority were joined in the suit. See id. The defendant suburban cities were
later dismissed from the suit after agreeing not to contest remedial measures. See id. The
City of Dallas was joined later. See WalkerIII, 734 F. Supp. at 1290. By 1999, the remaining
defendants were Dallas, the Dallas Housing Authority, and HUD. See Walker V, 169 F.3d at
975.
39 See Walker I, 734 F. Supp. at 1234.
40 See id. at 1235.
41 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 977.
42 See id.
43 See id. at 977.
44 The West Dallas project was the second largest in the country, and was in extremely
poor condition. See Walker HI, 734 F. Supp. at 1295, 1296 & n.2.
45 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 977.
46 See id. at 984.
47 See id.
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be combined with new construction or acquisition in predominantly
white areas to remedy past discrimination and therefore ordered con-
struction of a limited number of new housing units in predominantly
white areas of Dallas.48 All new housing opportunities would be cre-
ated in predominantly white areas until half the total opportunities
were in such areas.49 The new apartments to be constructed in white
neighborhoods would be populated by people who were success sto-
ries in the Family Self-Sufficiency Program5 ° and designed in consulta-
tion with nearby communities.51
White homeowners sued to block the construction of the new
units, and their case was consolidated for trial with the Walker case.
The district court held against the white homeowners, but in Walker V,
the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's order to
build the housing in white neighborhoods. 52 Ironically, the district
court had put great effort into making housing acceptable to white
neighborhoods, including a requirement of consultation with the
neighbors in the planning process and occupancy by employed ten-
ants.53 The Fifth Circuit treated the careful and consultative planning
as evidence of the dangers of public housing and therefore an argu-
ment against the remedial plan, rather than as evidence of a narrowly
tailored remedy with minimal negative impact on white
neighborhoods.54
The Fifth Circuit held that the white homeowners had a constitu-
tional right not to have their neighborhoods selected on the basis of
their whiteness for remedial housing construction, at least on the facts
presented here.55 The remedial use of race must be narrowly tailored,
which the Fifth Circuit believed meant the use of race-neutral meas-
ures if at all possible. Because Section 8 might operate successfully as
a race-neutral program, the court held that it must be attempted as a
48 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 976. The majority of units could be replaced through
Section 8 vouchers and certificates, subject to court oversight. See id. at 977-78.
49 See id.
50 See id. at 986. The Family Self-Sufficiency Program emphasizes upward mobility
through employment or education and demands rigorous adherence to housing rules. See
id at 986 n.35.
51 See id at 987.
52 The white homeowners were found to have standing, see id. at 976, because their
neighborhoods had been selected for the location of public housing based on the race of
the residents and therefore faced the threatened "harm" of having public housing put into
their neighborhoods based on the possibility of decline in property values and in quality of
life. See id. at 980.
53 See id. at 987.
54 See id. (finding that the stringent controls show "considerable sensitivity to the fact
that public housing has in the past been disgracefully neglected in Dallas" and stating that
while the remedial order "attempts to placate [homeowners'] fears of deterioration in
their neighborhoods" it also "lends credibility to those fears").
55 See id.
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race-neutral measure despite findings by the district court that the
program would not sufficiently remedy segregation in Dallas.56 The
Fifth Circuit found that the fact that 285 black families-about ten
percent of Section 8 recipients-had moved to white areas with Sec-
tion 8 certificates between 1994 and 1996 showed that Section 8 could
become a workable desegregatory program, despite its past weak-
nesses.5 7 Astonishingly, although the Fifth Circuit proposed some
measures that it believed could be undertaken to resolve some of the
problems identified by the district court, the Walker Vopinion did not
address the rest of those problems, including the insufficient availabil-
ity of larger apartments. 58 Because this lawsuit involved only black
plaintiffs, not all minorities, the Fifth Circuit saw no reason to locate
housing opportunities only in white neighborhoods, asserting that re-
medial housing could also be placed in neighborhoods that included
Hispanics.5 9 The proper criteria should therefore be "a vigorous Sec-
tion 8 program, non-black neighborhoods, census tracts in which no pub-
lic housing currently exists, or non-poor neighborhoods."60 Because
the Fifth Circuit imagined that there were "promising, non-racially
discriminatory ways" to continue to desegregate public housing in Dal-
las, it vacated and remanded the district court's order that units be
located in white areas.61
56 See id. at 985.
57 See id. at 984. A plan to move holders of Section 8 certificates and vouchers to areas
where there were few other section 8 tenants had resulted in approximately 21% of the
black holders of such certificates moving to white neighborhoods between 1987 and 1996.
See id. at 984 & n.25; see also Roisman & Botein, supra note 13, at 340-41 (discussing the
Dallas housing mobility program). The section 8 mobility program that resulted in pro-
gress during 1994-96 was not race-neutral but race-conscious, requiring placement of black
tenants into areas not "impacted" by minority racial concentrations or concentrations of
poverty. See generally Walker I, 734 F. Supp. 1231, 1240-42, 1247-61 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (dis-
cussing DHA's failure to meet consent decree requirements to move tenants to "non-im-
pacted areas" between 1987 and 1989 and reprinting the consent decree), vacated and
remanded, 912 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1990); id. at 1260 (specifying that the units "shall be
located in non-racially impacted areas pursuant to HUD's site-selection regulations"). The
Fifth Circuit apparently considered "race-neutral" any remedial structure that did not use
the classification white and race-conscious any plan that put blacks into "white" neighbor-
hoods. See infra Part IV.B.
58 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 984 (noting this problem among others). The Fifth Circuit
did not directly address these problems when discussing the workability of Section 8 rem-
edy. See id. at 985-86.
59 See id. at 987.
60 Id. (emphasis added). Of course, moving "blacks" to "nonblack" areas is a race-
conscious program, and "nonblack" is a racial classification. See infra Part IV.B; cf John
Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority Genymanders, 111 HARv. L. REv. 576, 585 n.33
(1997) (arguing that "nonblack" is a racial classification).
61 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 987.
20001 1319
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
II
INSIGHTS FROM CRITICAL RACE THEORY
A common early criticism of critical theory was that it was not
practical: it didn't "do" anything; it consisted only of deconstruction,
or perhaps only destruction.62 In fact, critical theory articulates the
harm of racial oppression with richness and specificity, providing firm
underpinnings for undertaking transformative work. These insights
can help determine which remedial options will precisely target the
harms of segregation. In this Part, I review several insights of critical
race theory and feminist theory that contribute greatly to the analysis
of the harms of segregation. Part III applies these concepts to reme-
dies in public housing cases like Walker.
A. The Social Construction of Race
Race as a social construction with many meanings and multiple con-
structed identities: The literature on this question is vast and by now
well-established. 63 Race is neither a skin color, nor a natural or bio-
logical division of humankind.64 The concept of race is historically
located, culturally and socially specific, and therefore continually
under construction in our own time. Once race was understood as a
social construction, scholars identified different meanings and con-
cepts attached to the term race itself.65 Further scholarly work identi-
fied whiteness as a racial construction, protected as a dominant norm
by its ability to appear neutral and natural to white people.66 The
concept of whiteness will be explored in detail in Part II.B.
62 See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 L. &
Soc. INQUIRY 779 (1992).
63 For an introduction to the literature, see CUTcAL RACE THEORY. THE CUTTING
EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); AUDREY SMEDLEY, RACE IN NORTH AMERICA (1993);
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L.
REV. 461 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, CRT 1]; Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO.
L. REv. 159 (1995).
64 See, e.g., Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choie 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 27-37 (1994).
65 See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 37-40, 56-59 (1991) (identifying "status-race," "formal-race," "historical-race," and "cul-
ture-race").
66 See DERRIcr BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIALJUSrICE
(1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; DERRICK BELL, FACEs AT THE BoTTOM
OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); BARBARAJ. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now
I SEE: WHrrE RACE CONSCaOUSNESS AND THE LAW (1998); ToM MomusON, PLAYING IN THE
DARK, WHrENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION (1992); STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN Er AL.,
PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996).
Second, in awarding relief and in proposing locations for remedial housing, the Fifth
Circuit misunderstood the meaning of the term "race-neutral;" it proposed remedial alter-
natives that were in fact race-conscious but refused to allow white neighborhoods to be
selected for remedial construction.
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The critique of colorblindness: Scholars pointed to the impossibility
of ignoring race in America,67 the destructive search for colorblind-
ness, and the importance of race consciousness. 68 Critical scholarship
emphasized the importance of recognizing racial constructions.69
Concurrently, the critique of the intent standard emphasized the futility of
distinguishing unconstitutional discrimination based on the intent of
the governmental actor.70 An individualistic model of racism under-
lies the intent model.71 Critical race theorists pointed instead to a
system of cultural meanings72 and a political and social economy or-
ganized to produce certain forms of power and privilege. 73
The relationship between race and economic subordination: This rela-
tionship can involve the analysis of oppression, for example, the inter-
section of race and poverty for poor African Americans in public
housing and inner city neighborhoods, and the relationship between
public housing and exclusion from access to work within metropolitan
economies. 74 More broadly, scholarly attention to the intersection of
class and race provided theoretical tools to examine the tendency in
the United States to imagine subordination as a matter of either race
67 See Gotanda, supra note 65, at 16-23 (arguing that "nonrecognition is self-
contradictory").
68 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic identify the critique of colorblindness with
CRT's extensive critique of liberalism. See Delgado & Stefancic, CRT , supra note 63, at
462. Works listed in Delgado and Stefancic's bibliography that critique colorblindness in-
clude BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 66; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-
Conscousness, 91 CoLum. L. REv. 1060 (1991); KimberlM Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform,
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L.
RP'v. 1331 (1988); andJerome McCristal Culp,Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and
Original Understandings, 1991 Dura L.J. 39. Barbara Flagg explores the particular appeal of
colorblindness to whites. See FLAGG, supra note 66, at 68-74. Ruth Frankenberg calls aware-
ness without perpetuation of racial domination "race cognizance." SeeRutrrH FRANEENBERG,
WHrrE WOMEN, RACE MAtRs: THE SOCIAL CONSrUCTION OF WHrrNEss 157-76 (1993).
69 See FRANKENBFRG, supra note 68, at 11.
70 Fundamentally, this is part of the critique of liberalism identified by Richard Del-
gado and Jean Stefancic as an important theme in Critical Race Theory. See Delgado &
Stefancic, CRT I, supra note 63, at 462.
71 See, eg., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1054-55
(1978) (describing the way that law adopts the perspective of the perpetrator and "views
racial discrimination not as a social phenomenon, but merely as the misguided conduct of
particular actors," and linking the perpetrator perspective to a "fault model" that requires
finding intent to discriminate).
72 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence I, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Ruv. 317, 356-61 (1987).
73 See generally POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAwV: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER (Leslie Bender &
Daan Braveman eds., 1995) (gathering many articles on critical race theory and organizing
one chapter, "Construction of Exclusion in Law," by categories including "racial classifica-
tions," "gender and sexuality," "the poor," and "people with disabilities"; also, including in
chapter on "Identity" a section called "Intersections and Patterns of Power and Privilege").
74 See Calmore, supra note 12; Martha Mahoney, Note, Law and Racial Geography: Public
Housing and the Economy in New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. Ruv. 1251 (1990).
20001 1321
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
or class, rather than understanding that both are important simulta-
neously.75 White privilege and residential segregation diminish class
consciousness for white people; they help to construct a middle-class
sensibility in white people.76 Critical work on race and space7 7 borrowed
from other areas of social theory the idea of the racial construction of
social space. Critical theorists pointed out that the concept of race
has no natural truth or meaning, but derives some of its meaning
from its spatial construction in contemporary society.78
Intersectionality and the critique of essentialism: Kimberl6 Crenshaw
identified the experience of African-American women as neither
merely the product of gender oppression, nor of sexual subordina-
tion-nor was it a product of each added to the other.79 Rather, wo-
men of color faced particular sorts of oppression based on the
combination of their race and gender.80 Further, Martha Fineman's
work on dependency and single mothers identified dependency as in-
evitable in human existence; it also identified "derivative dependency"
in caregivers-those who take care of the dependent-because their
time available for other work is reduced by caregiving.8 One cannot
adequately theorize the situation of low-income black women caring
75 See John 0. Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race and Class in Representing the
Black Poor, 61 OR. L. REv. 201, 215 (1982) ("[A] dvances made in the name of the race have
enhanced the opportunities of more privileged blacks but have failed to address the
problems of the black poor.").
76 See Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1659, 1669-84 (1995) [hereinafter Mahoney, Segregation]; see also Martha Mahoney, The
Anti-Transformation Cases: Whiteness, Class, and Interest (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
77 See DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAw, 1836-1948 (1998); PAUL A. JARcow-
sKy, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOES, BARRIos, AND THE AmRicAN Crrv (1997).
78 See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Direct Democracy, Racial Group Agency, Local Government Law, and
Residential Racial Segregation: Some Reflections on Radical and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L.
REv. 185 (1997); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1841 (1994); Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sover-
eignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1997).
79 See KimberlM Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Femi-
nist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139 (explaining the multidimensional experience and oppression of African-
American women).
80 For example, Angela Harris criticized feminist theorists, such as Catharine MacKin-
non, for describing the experience of women based on that of white women, as if that
experience must stand either for the oppression of all women or for the minimum oppres-
sion experienced by women. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 590-601 (1990).
81 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEmAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SExuAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 162-63 (1995) (arguing that dependency and
caregiving rather than sexual ties through marriage should be the fundamental basis for
family law); see also Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependenty"from a Different
Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961 (1993) (giving examples of demands of family on single mothers
and arguing that the suggestions that welfare mothers get a husband or get a job do not
actually address the multiple burdens these mothers face).
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for dependents in public housing unless all these factors are part of
the analysis.
B. Whiteness in Theory and Action
Some of the insights from critical race theory most important to
public housing issues involve the construction of whiteness. White-
ness is a distinct socially constructed identity.8 2 The concept of race
derives part of its power from seeming to be a natural phenomenon-
or at least a coherent social category. The concept of race is inher-
ently relational; the concept acquires meaning only in the context of
historical development and existing race relations.83 To have mean-
ing, it must describe more than one social group and the relations
between groups. The set of social and cultural meanings that make
up the concept of race continues to shift and change within our own
time. Because it is historical, social, and relational, race as a concept
is not comprehensible separately from social relations of domination
and subordination. Michael Omi and Howard Winant describe the
theory of race as "shaped by actually existing race relations in any
given historical period,"8 4 and always subject to contestation.8 5 Social
constructions are nevertheless "real," because we live under their
power and our view of the world is constrained by them. The set of
beliefs and cultural meanings that make up race is powerful. Once
race exists as a social construction, it is reproduced in society, in a
process we cannot halt simply by refusing to participate in it.86 An
individual decision not to "do race" or "be racial" cannot transform
the subordination and dominance that characterize both individual
and collective life in racialized society; furthermore, society cannot
make subordination and dominance disappear by attempting to not
recognize racial constructions.
82 The literature on whiteness has grown rapidly during the 1990s. For an overview
on the literature, see CRITCAL WHrrE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROP (Richard
Delgado &Jean Stefancic eds., 1997). For representative works on the topic, see, for exam-
ple, FLAGG, supra note 66; IAN F. HANEY-L6PFZ, WHITE BY LAw: THE LEGAL CONSTRUGION
OF RACE (1996); WHITE REIGN: DEPLOYING WHITENESS IN AMERICA (Joe L. Kincheloe et al.
eds., 1998); WHrrNEss: THE COMMUNICATION OF SOCIAL IDENTITY (Thomas K. Nakayama &
Judith N. Martin eds., 1999).
83 See, e.g., MICHAEL BANTON, DISCRIMINATION 3-4 (1994).
84 MICHAEL OMW & HowARD WNANT, RAcIAL FORMATION IN THE UNrTED STATES FROM
THE 1960s TO T=E 1990s 11 (1986).
85 For example, Omi and Winant identify a transition in the 1920s from biologistic
and social Darwinian views of race to an ethnicity-based paradigm and the challenge that
the ethnicity-based paradigm, in turn, faced in 1960s. See id. at 9-11.
86 See Kendall Thomas, Rouge et NoirReread: A Popular Constitutional Histoy of the Angelo
Herndon Case 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2599 (1992).
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In recent years, social and legal theorists have focused on explor-
ing whiteness as a racial identity.8 7 As a first part of this project, the
dominant norm which is transparent88 to those within its sphere, was
made visible and cognizable.8 9 Ruth Frankenberg divides whiteness
into a set of "linked dimensions": a location of structural advantage
and race privilege; a standpoint from which white people look at
themselves, at others, and at society; and a set of cultural practices that
are usually unmarked and unnamed.90 The interaction of the mate-
rial world and the ways we explain and understand it generate "experi-
ence"; therefore, the experience of whiteness is something
continuously constructed, reconstructed, and transformed for white
people.9 1
White people have difficulty perceiving whiteness. 92 Like cul-
ture,93 race is something we notice in ourselves only in relation to
87 See, e.g., FLAc, supra note 66; FRANKENBERG, supra note 68; MORRISON, supra note
66; DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHrrENESS: RAcE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
WORKING CLASS (1991). Kevin Brown suggests that "[wihite academics with an interest in
race must relinquish their self-appointed role as the 'translators' of black cultures, in fa-
vour of analyses of white society, i.e. of racism." Kevin Brown, Race, Class and Culture: To-
wards a Theorization of the "Choice/Constraint" Concept in SocLL INTERAGrION AND ETHNIC
SEGREGATION 185, 198 (Peter Jackson & Susan J. Smith eds., 1981).
88 See FLAGG, supra note 66, at 957 (defining the "transparency phenomenon").
89 Ruth Frankenberg notes that this is difficult, in part because the concept of white-
ness has been discussed openly in the United States mostly by advocates of white
supremacy. See FRAN ENBERG, supra note 68, at 232.
90 Id. at 1. Frankenberg defines whiteness as the cumulative way that race shapes the
lives of white people. Id.
91 Frankenberg notes:
Discursive repertoires may reinforce, contradict, conceal, explain, or "ex-
plain away" the materiality or the history of a given situation. Their inter-
connection, rather than material life alone, is in fact what generates
"experience"; and, given this, the "experience" of living as a white woman
in the United States is continually being transformed.
Id. at 2.
92 "For a significant number of young white women, being white felt like being cul-
tureless." Id. at 196. One woman described "the formlessness of being white":
Being a Californian, I'm sure it has its hallmarks, but to me they were invisi-
ble.... If I had an ethnic base to identify from, ifI was even Irish American,
that would have been something formed, if I was a working-class woman,
that would have been something formed. But to be a Heinz 57 American, a
white, class-confused American, land of the Kleenex type American, is so
formless in and of itself. It only takes shape in relation to other people.
Id.
93 Anthropologist Renato Rosaldo describes "culture" as something one does not per-
ceive oneself as having; culture is something that is seen in someone else. See RENATO
Ros '.Do, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SocmAL ANALYSIS 198-99 (1989); cf Mar
J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a jurisprudence for the Last
Reconstruction, 100 YALE LJ. 1329 (1991) (indicating that we hear accent in others, but not
in ourselves). According to Rosaldo, culture is perceived in inverse proportion with power.
the less full citizenship one possesses, the more culture one is likely to have. See RosA.Do,
supra, at 198-99. What we ourselves do and think is the way we are, normal and neutral,
like the air we breathe, transparent to us-not culture. See id. at 198.
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others. Although privileged identity requires reinforcement and
maintenance, protection against seeing the mechanisms that maintain
privilege is an important component of the privilege itself.94 The
manifestations of privilege seem elusive and subtle to whites who seek
to identify them.95 Whiteness facilitates achievement, diminishes con-
flict, and grants access, all while diminishing awareness of one's own
race.96 One of the privileges of whiteness is, therefore, not-seeing our
privilege,97 including not seeing how whites' actions appear to those
defined into the category "Other." Whites cannot simply opt out of
the process of formation of white racial consciousness that takes the
form of unconsciousness. Whiteness therefore easily reproduces itself
even when whites have no conscious will to exclude-as when people
find desirable friends, acquaintances, and job candidates to be others
like themselves-as well as when exclusion is conscious and willful.
Whites see themselves as acting as individuals, rather than as
members of a culture. The idea of self without culture and not part of
a collectivity is itself part of white cultural dominance in the United
States.98 The racial privilege that facilitates mobility and comfort in
ordinary life is particularly difficult for whites to see.99 In contrast,
94 See Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to
See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in PowER, PRIVILEGE AND L,W: A CmIVL
RIGHrs READER, supra note 73, at 22.
95 When Peggy McIntosh identified forty-six ways she experienced white privilege in
her daily life, her list included things that happen because she is white and things that do
not happen because she is white, such as the ability to shop alone and confident that she
will not be followed or harassed. See id. at 25; see also Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves"
Securing Black People's Right to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REv 147, 147
("[I]n so very many areas of public life, blacks in general are treated like an outlaw
people.").
96 McIntosh conceptualizes her white privilege as "an invisible weightless knapsack of
special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes,
compass, emergency gear, and blank checks." See McIntosh, supra note 94, at 23. The
knapsack includes unearned assets (things that should be entitlements of humanity and
that everyone should have in ajust society, but which in fact are awarded to the dominant
race) and unearned power conferred systematically (those things that are damaging in
human terms even as they bring advantage and are associated only with dominance, such
as the freedom not to be concerned about the needs, culture, or reality of others).
97 The difficulty of whites in perceiving white privilege has affected the way discrimi-
nation is understood. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 79, at 151 ("[S]ex and race discrimina-
tion have come to be defined in terms of the experiences of those who are privileged but
for their racial or sexual characteristics."); see also id. at 152 ("[T]he problem is that [Black
women] can receive protection only to the extent that their experiences are recognizably
similar to those whose experiences tend to be reflected in antidiscrimination doctrine.").
See generally FLAGG, supra note 66 (explaining that the transparency of whiteness to whites
affects the way whites perceive "intentional" discrimination).
98 Peggy McIntosh notes that she was raised to see herself as an individual and not as
part of a culture. See McIntosh, supra note 94, at 24.
99 See, e.g., Lena Williams, When Blacks Shop, Bias Often Accompanies Sale, N.Y. TimES,
Apr. 30, 1991, atAl (describing the experience of a young black man stopped by police for
returning to a bank to ask questions and get brochures, then sitting in his car to read
them, who was suspected of being a bank robber).
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whiteness is visible when it appears to be the basis on which well-being
is threatened.
The meaning of whiteness cannot be separated from racism.100
White dominance is the product of a social history of racial power and
subordination and of contemporary racial constructions, which
merged a variety of ethnic, regional, social and economic phenomena
into a dominant phenomenon of whiteness. 1 1 Exploring whiteness
therefore permits dominant norms to be deprived of some normative
power without first determining whether a particular event is under-
stood by whites as racist (usually meaning a conscious sense of preju-
dice, bias, antagonism, or the will to dominate or exploit). 10 2 Most
whites understand racism as something that a second party (the racist
actor) does to a third party (the subordinated person of a minority
race).103 Because of whites' difficulty in perceiving whiteness, racism
appears to us a phenomenon distinct from ourselves. Since the domi-
nant norm of whiteness and the mechanisms of its reproduction are
transparent to us, bigotry and prejudice-individualized and inten-
tional-become the focus of white interest. Whites do, however, sense
racism when they experience hostility or resentment against them-
selves as whites, or even in the discomfort inflicted by being forced to
feel conscious of whiteness. Both hostility in others and self-con-
sciousness become interventions in the norm of white transparency
and the apparently natural state of affairs in which whites prosper. In
the logic of white privilege, making whites feel white is itself racist.
Ruth Frankenberg analyzed the discursive repertoires used by
white women to discuss race. 10 4 She explains that white people rou-
tinely practice color evasion and power evasion. Color evasion occurs
when white people insist they do not notice their own color or the
color of others.10 5 Power evasion occurs when whites acknowledge
perceiving color but deny the existence of any connection between
color and power.10 6
Whiteness appears to whites as a state of nature, not as a social
construction. Whiteness is not generally visible to whites until it is en-
dangered. Transformative programs threaten color evasion and
power evasion as well as white numerical or social dominance. It is
nearness of the Other that creates "race" for white people. Segrega-
tion created white neighborhoods, but most whites spontaneously see
100 See FRANKENBERG, supra note 68, at 174.
101 See, e.g., 1 THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE: RAcIAL OPPRES-
SION AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1994); NOEL IGNATTEV, How THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995).
102 See FRANKENBERG, supra note 68, at 6.
103 See Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 76, at 1667.
104 See Frankenberg, supra note 68, passim
105 See id. at 142-43.
106 See id. at 14-15.
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these as "neighborhoods" rather than "white neighborhoods" until de-
segregation threatens-then suddenly they have a race, which seems
an inappropriate ground for interference with the state of nature.
The call to do away with race in decision making has great
resonance for whites when combined with the assertion that immi-
grants have no historic guilt for black subordination; these arguments
both oppose racism and simultaneously protect whites. The call to
"just stop doing race" is consistent with a sense of justice as involving
rejection of racism and attractive because positioned white perception
continually misses the ongoing reproduction of race. Because whites
perceive race as meaning "Other," the call to stop making racial classi-
fications also has appeal beyond its instrumental use in protecting
white interests; morally and emotionally, it seems cleansing. This ap-
proach nicely suits those whites who oppose racism, believe they are
not racist, and believe they face discrimination against themselves for
being white.
The dominance of white norms is partly supported by the fact
that dominance looks like a state of nature to white people. Resi-
dence in "good neighborhoods" therefore appears to whites to define
the merit of the residents, not the social construction of whiteness. 0 7
The white belief in whiteness as natural is important in understanding
the resistance to race remedy in the field of law. To avoid reproduc-
ing white privilege, we need to apply these insights to race remedy,
the subject of Part III below, and to courts' resistance to race reme-
dies, the subject of Part IV.
RETHINKING RACE AND THE HARMS OF SEGREGATION:
ILIPUCATIONS FOR REMEDY
A. Metropolitan Segregation and the Ongoing Construction
of Race
Assisted housing in America is thoroughly organized around ra-
cial lines.'0 8 Most importantly, programs and projects are located
within metropolitan areas that reflect broad segregated patterns of ex-
clusionary white neighborhoods and impoverished neighborhoods of
107 See Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 76, at 1660-69.
108 See sources cited supra note 18.
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color.10 9 As Charles Abrams"10 and Kenneth Jackson"' have ex-
plained, the federal government had been responsible for the crea-
tion of maps that governed mortgage lending. Those maps-the
genesis of "redlining"-ranked as unacceptable for mortgage lending
and underwriting the areas where people of color lived."12 Once seg-
regated neighborhoods developed, segregation could be rationalized
and naturalized: both the original maps and today's residential pat-
terns could be falsely perceived be the result of a "natural" preference
for living near one's own kind.113 Segregation appears unproblemati-
cally either as the result of white preferences for living near whites
and a deep, natura4 and unchanging white aversion to living near peo-
ple of color-especially African Americans-or of the preference of Af-
rican Americans to live near other black people."14
Redlining was not natural, but a regulatory structure that en-
forced segregation on the market. 1 5 During the years of expanding
suburbanization, federal loans and federally insured loans were re-
fused to minorities. Equally important, lenders refused to make loans
and agencies refused to insure loans in neighborhoods in which mi-
norities lived.116 Many whites say they want to live in an environment
that is not all white. 117 Imagine a developer who actually wanted to
make about five percent of his units available to African Americans to
satisfy the preference for some integration that whites express. That
109 See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 2 ("The most salient feature of postwar
segregation is the concentration of blacks in central cities and whites in suburbs.").
11o In the mid-1950s, Charles Abrams wrote a searching critique of the role of federal
housing programs in segregating American cities and suburbs. See CHARLES ABRAMs, FOR-
BIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING (1955). Abrams's insights were not
much incorporated into the theoretical treatment of segregation in law until the past ten
years; but they have been important to scholars working in the field of race and space.
I11 See KENETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 190-230 (1985) (emphasizing importance of federal government's role in
producing segregation and in shaping private-sector discrimination).
112 See id. at 197-203.
113 But see Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 76, at 1669-72 (noting that whites claim a
preference for "living in slightly desegregated communities"). But studies consistently
show that segregation is not natural: "The extensive literature on the causes of residential
racial segregation substantially agrees on three propositions: Residential racial segregation
is not 'natural'; it is not generally the result of black preference; and it is not primarily the
product of economic differences between blacks and whites." Roisman, supra note 13, at
487-88 (footnotes omitted).
114 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 1-2.
115 See id. at 203-18.
116 See id.
117 Many whites generally state that they would prefer a small percentage of people of
color-noticeably different from blacks' preference of a neighborhood that had approxi-
mately equal percentages of blacks and whites. See MAsSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 89
(citing Reynolds Farley et al., Barrie to the Racial Integration of Neighborhoods: The Detroit
Case, 104 ANNALs AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 441 (1979); Reynolds Farley et al., "Chocolate
City, Vanilla Suburbs" Will the Trend Toward Racially Separate Committees Continue2, 330 Soc.
Sci. RES. 7 (1978)).
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developer would not have qualified for federally funded or underwrit-
ten mortgages or for many forms of mortgage insurance. Obviously,
this practice would affect both the ability to buy the homes and to
resell them. Therefore, if whites actually desired desegregated living
environments and were actually pleased to have black neighbors, their
homes would still have been worth less, simply because of the pres-
ence of people of color nearby.118 Redlining makes whites who be-
lieve in integration into market losers." 9
Counterintuitively, redlining also reveals that whiteness-far from
being natural-is inherently unstable. Whites will not sufficiently po-
lice whiteness on their own initiative; therefore, whiteness must be po-
liced by lenders and insurers to create and protect white
neighborhoods. Redlining reflects racism, but it also breeds racism by
creating negative economic consequences for integration and punish-
ing deviation from racist norms. The isolation of whites from people
of color, in addition to the existence of white privilege, breeds fear of
the Other and the continuation of white dominant norms.
Just as metropolitan segregation constructs whiteness as natural
and dominant, it simultaneously constructs blackness through ghet-
toization. Ghettoes are defined by both race andjoblessness. 120 They
are not merely neighborhoods where minorities live, but rather neigh-
borhoods that reflect a lack of choice about where to live, economic
oppression, and the linkage of economic oppression and race. Ini-
tially, ghettoization reflected the exclusion of blacks from growing ar-
eas of both jobs and new housing.12' Public housing became
stigmatized in a process that stigmatized poor people's housing in an
increasingly prosperous America after World War H1,122 and a simulta-
neous process in which racially segregated projects in increasingly
118 See Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 76, at 1671-72.
119 Telephone conversation with Michelle Adams (March 1997). I am grateful to Pro-
fessor Michelle Adams for this formulation of the problem.
120 Defining ghettoes by both race andjoblessness avoids the problem of treating all
black neighborhoods as ghettoes. See WILAM JuLius WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:
THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PuBLIc Poucy 93-106 (1987); Mahoney, supra note
74, at 1266-68; see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 2 (emphasizing structured links
between segregation of blacks and poverty).
121 Elsewhere I have noted that-
[h]ousing projects became predominantly black because of the exclusion
of blacks from even subsistence-level employment. The shift from an up-
wardly mobile population to a chronically underemployed population coin-
cided with the racial transformation of the public housing population as a
whole. These shifts are not coincidental, but describe different parts of the
same phenomenon: a segregatory process in which white people and jobs
left the cities.
Mahoney, supra note 74, at 1253 (citations omitted).
122 In contrast, whites willingly moved in well-built white projects in New Orleans dur-
ing 1960s, even though they did not seem to need them on a wide scale, while there were
long waiting lists at mostly black projects. See id. at 1281-84.
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ghettoized cities were also stigmatized-as too black.123 The associa-
tion of ghettoes with public housing then became part of the process
by which white America constructed its image of African Ameri-
cans. 124 Black communities increasingly became associated with high
permanent unemployment rates. 125 The effects of a declining econ-
omy were placed heavily on African-American communities and then
were treated as inherent characteristics of those communities. 12 6 In-
sidiously, unemployment and ultimately unemployability became
identified with blackness.
This process of the construction of race and space had two re-
lated results: Black communities became defined in part to white
America by the unemployability of their residents. In addition, resi-
dents of low-income black communities were increasingly likely to be
identified as unworthy of employment relative to other demographic
groups and other African Americans. One study found that employ-
ers bluntly described their biases in hiring, generalized about whites
and blacks, and asserted that whites had a better work ethic than
blacks.' 2 7
The preconceptions held by the employers were somewhat af-
fected by class, which they determined by interpreting the ways em-
ployees dressed and spoke. 128 Geography was also important: "inner
city" was equated with "Black, poor, uneducated, unskilled, lacking in
123 See id. at 1265 (describing the development of this stigma in New Orleans: "Once
the majority of tenants were black,... [a] cultural shift occurred that stigmatized [public
housing], making it more undesirable. Once completely defined by race, public housing
was more stigmatized than the first black projects had been, when they were smaller, hope-
ful, in mixed-income neighborhoods, and matched by white projects").
124 Site selection in minority neighborhoods by public officials helped segregate public
housing. See Roisman, Intentional Racial Discrimination, supra note 18. The processes of
ghettoization and impoverishment surrounded projects which had often been built in mi-
nority neighborhoods and segregated by government policy. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note
74 (describing New Orleans housing projects).
125 See WILSON, supra note 120, at 31.
126 See Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 76, at 1682 ("The development of an under-
class, the feminization of poverty, and related phenomena were treated as racial phenom-
ena and discussed in political and social discourse as characteristics of black inner-city
communities, when in fact they are part of the nationwide transitions in work opportunity
that now impact white working people as well as blacks."); Mahoney, supra note 74, at 1286
(noting the danger of the stereotype that blackjoblessness is due to cultural qualities in-
herent in black inner-city communities (citing WILSON, supra note 120, at 14)).
127 See Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them, But
.. " The Meaning ofRaceforEmployers, in THE URBAN UNDmERCLASs 203, 203-04 (Christopher
Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (noting that in employers' eyes black race and
ethnicity reinforce various other characteristics, such as instability, uncooperativeness, and
dishonesty); see also MAssEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 94-95 (reporting white stereotypes
of blacks including failure to care for homes, lower work ethic, less ambition, and greater
tendency to commit crimes).
128 See Kirschenman & Neckerman, supra note 127, at 213-15.
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values, crime, gangs, drugs, and unstable families."129 "Suburb," in
contrast, meant "white, middle class, educated, skilled, and stable fam-
ilies." °30 Residence in public housing or the inner city signalled lower-
class status, identified with undesirable characteristics as employees. 13'
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that some studies have found that
black families who move to the suburbs find greater success at finding
employment 3 2 The greater number of suburban jobs is extremely
important, 33 but it is also noteworthy that these tenants have moved
to a more advantaged position with regard to address discrimination:
they are not only closer to the jobs, employers may also be more likely
to hire them. 34
B. The Harm of Segregation and the Importance of Race-
Conscious Relief
Race-conscious relief is crucial in housing segregation cases, and
an understanding of the harm of segregation is fundamental to devel-
oping well-constructed remedies. Most studies of housing segregation
treat the concentration of minorities and the link between ghettoiza-
tion and poverty as the harms of segregation. 135 The Supreme Court
has adopted an increasingly formalistic approach to racial segregation
over the past decade; it treats racial identification or classification of
race as inherently harmful except when it appears "natural" to the
Court and therefore not to have been caused by the state.' 36 Justice
O'Connor's discussion of race in Shaw v. Ren0137 shows that she
equates racial classification with racial separation; she sees separation as
129 Id. at 215.
130 1d.
131 See id. at 216.
132 SeeJames E. Rosenbaum & Susan J. Popkin, Employment and Earnings of Lou-Income
Blacks Who Move to Middle-Class Suburbs, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 127, at 342,
344.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 346-50.
135 To Massey and Denton, the concentration and hypersegregation of blacks as the
result of separation is the relevant harm. See MAssEY & DENTON, supra note 11, at 74-78,
129.
136 See discussion infra Part IV. The term "natural" appears injustice O'Connor's con-
currence in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 111 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Whether the white exodus ... was caused by the District Court's remedial orders or by
natural if unfortunate, demographicforces ... the segregative effects... did not transcend its
geographical boundaries.") (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit adopted this view in
Walker Vwhen it treated the selection of sites for housing in white neighborhoods as "race
conscious," see Walker v. City of Mesquite 169 F.3d 973, 982 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 181 F.3d
98 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 969 (2000) ("In short, is it constitutional in this
case to implement a race-conscious site selection criterion for newly built or acquired pub-
lic housing?"), but never treated the whiteness of those neighborhoods as unnatural or
problematic.
137 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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an inherent harm, 3 8 rather than seeing the construction of subordina-
tion and privilege as the crucial issue in race cases. In such an analysis,
segregation becomes an issue of racial classification and separation
rather than an issue of dominance and privilege on one side and sub-
ordination and poverty on the other. If race is inherently about
power, however, then segregation must be about power as well. For-
malism about race or segregation misses important questions: the im-
portance of self-definition by subordinated groups, including the
right to live with themselves or others as they choose and to gain
whatever power they can, and the inefficacy of remedies that, after
structuring a racial world, attempt to blink race away by preferring
race-neutral measures. 139
Segregation creates a link between blackness and subordination;
simultaneously, it links whiteness and privilege. Only if whiteness is
an invisible dominant norm can "segregation" mean "blackness" or
"Otherness." This is not merely a quarrel over terminology. Rather,
problematizing whiteness as well as blackness permits an entirely differ-
ent concept of remedy. The crucial legal question in cases like Walker
is whether the record supports race-conscious relief.' 40 If so, identical
standards need not be applied to mostly black areas and mostly white
areas; rather, remedial programs can and do create standards tailored
to the needs of different communities.14' Standards and classifica-
tions in remedial plans can then closely fit or can be narrowly tailored
to remedy precisely the harms of segregation.
Defining both privileged exclusionary whiteness and subordi-
nated ghettoized blackness as the harms of segregation ultimately sup-
ports both "mobility"142 and "equalization" 143 measures. Mobility
plans focus on desegregation; at a minimum, their goal is to end the
confinement of African Americans to mostly black communities. 44
Equalization remedies seek to improve conditions for black communi-
ties.145 If whiteness is part of the harm of segregation, however, deseg-
regation itself will be defined as involving changes to whiteness and
mobility will be organized differently.
Most remedial plans are based on one of two concepts of "race."
In the formal-race approach, race means the same thing for blacks
138 See id. at 649-51.
139 For a thoughtful discussion of the concerns over each of these issues within the
black community, see Adams, supra note 13, at 457-63.
140 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
141 For example, some remedies involve, as did the earlier Waker decree, some im-
provement of rundown housing units, projects, and neighborhoods, as well as desegre-
gatory measures. See Adams, supra note 13, at 465-67.
142 See id. at 447-63.
143 See id. at 464-85.
144 See id. at 447-63.
145 See id. at 464-85.
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and whites, and the separation of the races is itself the harm.146 The
remedy under this approach would be to make all housing assistance
contingent on moving to an area in which the tenant's race does not
predominate, for example, through the use of restricted Section 8 cer-
tificates. 147 There are practical problems with this approach: whites
sometimes decline housing assistance rather than make integrative
moves, and many waiting lists are made up mostly of African Ameri-
cans, thereby making actual integration difficult. In the other and
probably the most common approach, race tends to be a synonym for
blackness.148 Blackness is conceptualized as the problem, and white-
ness remains an invisible, dominant norm. Under this approach, rem-
edy means enabling black people to move out of black
neighborhoods, either through unit-based approaches (enabling
blacks to move to new sites in white areas) or tenant-based approaches
(giving black tenants certificates or vouchers so that they can move to
white areas) 149
Problematizing whiteness shifts the focus of remedial interest and
applies different standards to mostly white and mostly black areas. A
mandatory desegregation approach could be applied in white areas; it
would develop standards that would make it impossible for white areas
to remain exclusionary, but would offer blacks a choice about whether
to integrate with white areas or remain in black areas. An equalization
plan combined with options to make desegregatory moves could be
applied in black areas. For example, housing units in mostly white
areas, such as senior housing, could be converted to family occu-
pancy.150 Vacancies could be held open longer to permit housing au-
thorities to find a tenant who wanted to make a desegregatory move.
This approach would treat whiteness itself as a problem to be reme-
died, and it would remedy the exclusion of blacks from the privileges
of white areas. African-American areas present somewhat different
questions, especially when blacks are disproportionately over-
represented in waiting lists for assisted housing in many cities.151 In
146 These plans, of course, do not define "race" as a concept before deploying the
concept; rather, they incorporate a certain way of thinking about race, such as "formal
race," see Gotanda, supra note 65, in the way they describe the harm they seek to remedy.
147 In Sanders v. HD, "desegregative Section 8 certificates" were one component of a
multifaceted remedial plan. Sanders v. HUD, 872 F. Supp. 216, 219 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
148 See supra note 12.
149 Gautreaux is the classic example of this approach. See sources cited supra note 22.
150 To avoid site resistance, existing housing can be modified, for example, by combin-
ing smaller units into larger units. SeeJulian & Daniel, supra note 10, at 675.
151 See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (2d Cir. 1988).
When there are long waiting lists with many minority applicants and opportunities in white
areas are scarce, the Starrett City problem is reproduced: either choice or subsidy is elimi-
nated for minority applicants. On the other hand, whites will receive "desegregatory" of-
fers quickly, because most of the housing opportunities that arise will be in mostly black
areas. Criteria that disfavor minorities or reduce their choices were disfavored in Starrett
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identifiably black areas, remedy would focus on uplift and equaliza-
tion. Desegregatory offers could be made but held open less time, so
that black people on the waiting list would not be shut out of available
housing for long. This approach would solve the Starrett City prob-
lem:152 minorities would never be prevented from getting housing
that they were prepared to accept.
Furthermore, mobility for African Americans could include
breaking the link between blackness and poverty, 53 rather than sim-
ply rejecting blackness. Instead of writing standards that focus solely
on using Section 8 certificates to relocate tenants to racially diverse
areas, effective remedies could permit the use of at least some certifi-
cates to relocate African-American tenants from impoverished areas to
economically thriving areas, even if the new neighborhoods already had
significant numbers of African-American residents. I am not endors-
ing the proposals of the Walker court that "nonpoor, nonblack" neigh-
borhoods are the appropriate venue for locating remedial housing.
Substituting "nonpoor" neighborhoods for white neighborhoods may
fail to achieve the important goal of remedying racial exclusion and at
worst could increase the poverty rate in neighborhoods occupied by
people of color.
Effective remedy requires simultaneously taking actions that deseg-
regate by race and that deconcentrate poverty. It is important not to
merge these two standards either by equating racial segregation with
ending poverty or by refusing to take race-conscious action at all. Be-
City. See id. at 1101-03. The straightforward solution, of course, is to provide significantly
more housing and to end the artificially constructed zero-sum game. I am grateful to Flo-
rence Roisman for pointing out this solution.
152 Starett has used racial quotas to maintain racial diversity in its housing complex.
When black applicants sued, the court enjoined the city's practice, despite its argument
that quotas were adopted "at the behest of the state solely to achieve and maintain integra-
tion and were not motivated by racial animus." IM at 1099.
153 See Adams, supra note 13, at 464 (proposing that equalization remedies involve
housing code enforcement provision of amenities and tenant services, demolition of dilapi-
dated housing with one-for-one replacement of demolished units, and "real community
development addressing neighborhood conditions municipal services, and exposure to en-
vironmental hazards"); cf Calmore, Spatial Equality, supra note 11, at 1488. John Calmore
states:
Twenty-five years ago, the Kerner Commission Report concluded that the
future of our cities would be enhanced only through the combination of
enrichment programs designed to improve the quality of life in black com-
munities and programs designed to encourage integration of substantial
numbers of blacks into American society beyond the ghetto. The Report
warned us that integration would not occur quickly and therefore, that en-
richment had to be an important adjunct to any program of integration.
Spatial equality recognizes the continuing validity of this warning. It thus
demands, as a matter ofjustice, that the enrichment program finally receive
the policy attention and financial commitment necessary to compensate for
decades of neglect and active exploitation.
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cause there has been more than one element to the oppression of
segregation, different remedial benefits may be achieved by enabling
low-income African Americans to move into formerly all-white neigh-
borhoods than by moving them out of some all-black neighborhoods
with high concentrations of poverty. The combination of mandatory
desegregation of white areas with some freedom of choice for black
tenants would support both goals and address the core harms of
segregation. 54
Ultimately, race-conscious relief is necessary to the project of end-
ing segregation. Segregation involves many systems simultaneously
constructing relations of power and subordination: discriminatory acts
in renting or selling housing by individuals, corporations, and govern-
ments; the availability, effectiveness, and affordability of transporta-
tion systems, schools, childcare provisions, and other necessary
supports for family life; the price of housing relative to income; the
ages and sizes of families needing assistance relative to the sizes of
units available; and many other factors. Some problems may appear
race-neutral, but nonetheless have obvious impact on effective deseg-
regation. For example, families needing three or more bedrooms en-
counter great difficulty finding units in the suburbs that are
affordable on the fair market rent payments set by HUD. 155 If only
smaller households needing fewer bedrooms move to mostly white ar-
eas, then some desegregation will occur but greater numbers of peo-
ple will live in truly segregated conditions-that is, not only will they
live in mostly black areas, but they will not have a choice about it.
Some factors that appear race-neutral, however, merit closer ex-
amination. For example, in areas where cars are the main form of
transportation, public transportation is often weak-a seemingly neu-
tral observation. Yet, the American Bar Foundation has found that
black customers are systematically charged more for cars by dealers
than white customers.1 56 Although current Supreme Court decisions
ban the creation of racial preference programs to compensate for "so-
cietal" discrimination, 157 the issue in housing cases is how to cure
proven racial discrimination when so many social factors reinforce the
current structures of power.
For whites, the concentration of blacks somewhere other than
near white neighborhoods is the spatial phenomenon that allows
whiteness to remain both exclusive-physically populated mostly by
154 See Adams, supra note 13, at 485 (emphasizing housing choice as a theme).
155 See Roisman, Long Overdue, supra note 18, at 134 (describing problems with fair
market rent levels).
156 See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations,
104 HARv. L. Rv. 817 (1991).
157 See Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212-37 (1995); City of Rich-
mond v. J. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989) (O'Connor, J.).
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white persons-and a dominant norm-unnoticed except when
threatened. Breaking down the walls of exclusion therefore has the
effect of breaking down white dominance as well as making white
spaces less white. Contesting the social construction of blackness in-
volves in part defending the strengths and potential of black people
and their neighborhoods and in part opening the privileges associ-
ated with white areas to blacks. Under these circumstances, race-
targeted programs are vital to ensuring that transformation is possible
and effective.
C. Critical Race Theory: Useful Tools for Practical Problems
Critical race theory provides insights that can guide the develop-
ment of remedial plans.
The social construction of race: Residential segregation is one of the
social forces that makes race seem like a natural phenomenon rather
than a social construction. Just as we perceive our homes as physical
reality rather than as bundles of property rights protected by law, we
view our communities as a living society with its physical artifacts-this
is my neighbor's yard, this is my driveway-rather than as constructed
phenomena within social space.'5 8 Therefore, as they naturalize race,
segregated residential neighborhoods also naturalize racism and the
prevailing distribution of power.'5 9 Gary Orfield has pointed out that
courts use housing segregation to avoid recognizing school segrega-
tion. 160 Similarly, the concepts of black consumers or employees as
undesirable have been reinforced by the structures of segregation, in-
cluding redlining and isolation of whole communities from employ-
ment opportunities.
The failure of American government and society to undertake a
thorough effort to dismantle residential racial segregation also natu-
ralizes race and racism. Segregated housing appears to be the inevita-
ble result of many individual choices-just the way people want to
live.161 Segregation seems a natural expression of race because it
158 See Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 76, at 1661.
159 See id. at 1662.
160 See Gary Orfield, Housing and the Justification of School Segregation, 143 U. PA. L. Ray.
1397 (1995); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 111 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that demographic forces are "natural, if unfortunate").
161 Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974),
noted:
It is this essential fact of a predominantly Negro school population in De-
troit-caused by unknown and perhaps unknowable factors such as in-mi-
gration, birth rates, economic changes, or cumulative acts of private racial
fears-that accounts for the "growing core of Negro schools," a "core" that
has grown to include virtually the entire city.
Id. at 756 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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seems so difficult to alter: after all, we've had the Fair Housing Act
now for more than three decades, and it hasn't changed much; we
tried to improve public housing, but it didn't work; this is simply the
way things are. 162 Therefore, remedial plans could address the con-
struction of race by explaining in detail all the efforts that would actu-
ally be required to remedy the current construction of subordination
and inferiority, even if all those measures were not attempted in this
remedial plan because of financial or other constraints. Progress
would be measured against actual need as well as program goals; pro-
grams would be evaluated systematically in light of what was the scope
of this remedial plan as well as what was undertaken. This approach
would help to denaturalize race and racism. Especially important, it
would oppose narratives of the inevitability of oppression and the im-
possibility of transformation.
The relationship between race and economic subordination: Effective re-
medial measures would plan for employment decisions as well as
housing opportunities; they would weigh the potential effects on de-
segregation of all development decisions undertaken in the area, not
merely housing location.163 They would incorporate a variety of meas-
ures to counter both lack of jobs and the construction of unem-
ployability at the individual and the community level.'6
The links between race and space: If we really recognized the contri-
bution by past government actions to the construction of race and to
the distribution of work and housing across entire metropolitan areas,
the scope of remedy would broaden considerably. We would think
162 For example, Florence Roisman points out that at a conference on the results of
Mount Laurel, participants were asked whether segregation was just impossible to change.
In her article, Roisman points out that no race-based transformation had been attempted
in Mount Laurel cases. See Florence Wagman Roisman, The Role of the State, the Necessity of
Race-Conscious Remedies and Other Lessons from the Mount Laurel Study, 27 SErON HALL L. REV.
1386, 1394 (1997). Instead, the Mount Laurel housing programs stand for the difficulty of
achieving desegregation while using only race-neutral measures. Cf DAVID L. Ki, ET AL.,
OUR TowN: RAcE, HOUsING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995) (providing a detailed ac-
count of resistance to change in Mount Laurel, New Jersey).
163 See Mahoney, Segregation, supra note 76, at 1673.
164 This final category might include job training programs and subsidized car loans
for job transportation; location decisions for desegregative housing should be based on
access to jobs and transportation. It might also include involving residents in employment
bias testing for address discrimination, changing street names of minority applicant ad-
dresses to study change in the results, and publicizing success of these measures to public
housing residents. James Rosenbaum proposes to make cars, better public transportation,
employment training, and child care assistance part of mobility remedies such as the Gau-
treaux program. SeeJames E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the Kerner Commission's Housing Strategy
Improve Employment, Education, and Social Integration for Low-Income Blacks, in RACE, POVETY,
AND AMERiCAN Cms 273 (John Charles Boger & Judith Welch Wegner eds., 1996). Cf
Roisman, Long Overdue, supra note 18, at 176-77 (emphasizing the importance of
employment).
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more expansively about the sorts of government decisions involved in
urban segregation and also about the justification for a variety of
measures in desegregatory programs. Particularly, we would seek to
develop innovative programs that deal with the construction of
race-the ways in which segregation has bred racism-and not merely
with the physical arrangement of persons into mostly black and mostly
white communities.
As Richard Ford has pointed out,165 courts and commentators
frequently assume that segregative choices usually result from peo-
ple's "natural" desire to live with their own kind-particularly low-in-
come whites' naturalized (inevitable, unchanging, and unchangeable)
racism that makes them unwilling to live with African Americans. 166
Under an ideal remedial plan, everyone of any race who is willing to
make desegregative offers should be able to choose to move to any-
where their race does not predominate, 67 even desegregating choices
165 See Ford, supra note 78, at 1368.
166 Tenant assignment plans could treat choice for tenants as dangerous, since either
blacks or whites might choose to live in communities where their own race predominates
would mandate making only one offer of a housing unit in a desegregatory location to any
applicant who reached the top of a waiting list and removing applicants who declined
desegregatory offers from the list (or moving them to the bottom of the list). One federal
district court has recognized that
[i]t is of course well understood by those who must deal with problems of
bigotry and discrimination that the noble words "freedom of choice" often
are a euphemism for "racism." If the person at the top of the list of housing
applications had to accept the first available unit physically suitable for his
individual needs, or else be dropped to the bottom of the list, it is incon-
ceivable that after some twenty-five years the racial complexion of LMHA's
old housing projects would not at least be the same as that of the list of
housing applicants, if not of the community as a whole.
Jaimes v. Lucas Metro. Hous. Auth., No. C 74-68, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18190, at *13 (N.D.
Ohio May 12, 1989).
However, this approach may be of limited effectiveness for structural reasons. While it
would successfully deny or delay housing assistance for whites who were unwilling to move
to mostiy-black areas, see Roisman, Long Overdue, supra note 18, at 171, such policies will
have little impact on white applicants for senior citizen housing, the housing type sought
by many white applicants, because senior citizen housing is most likely to be located in
mostly-white areas. African-American senior citizens offered housing in mostly-white areas
should be able to consider whether they are satisfied with the offered location in relation
to their family needs, which may well have been affected by pervasive segregation in metro-
politan areas.
In addition to their structural limits, the emphasis on limiting choices for tenants
inherently reflects the view that tenants' and applicants' individual preferences are a pri-
mary cause of housing segregation. Remedial plans should recognize and correct systemic
problems of urban development, the location of assisted units, pervasive housing discrimi-
nation against people of color throughout the housing market, and the construction of
prejudice through redlining.
167 Sanders v. United States HUD, 872 F. Supp. 216 (W.D. Pa. 1994), the recent case from
the Pittsburgh area, uses a similar approach to remedy via consent decree, giving tenants a
choice of all desegregatory options available at the time:
Section VI of the [consent) decree calls for the eventual merger of the
public housing and Section 8 waiting lists. Individuals on the two lists will
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are not the only options permitted for housing applicants. 16 Group
moves could be arranged simultaneously by holding apartments open
until a group of tenants are ready to move together. Remedial plans
should address the systemic power and profit questions that helped
create housing segregation. Among other measures, this would neces-
sitate bringing all assisted housing programs in any area into any re-
medial scheme. Furthermore, remedial programs should explore and
address the extent to which administration of housing programs cre-
ated financial incentives favoring construction by developers of small
apartments in newer assisted housing units rather than larger apart-
ments; 169 since the difficulty of finding apartments of adequate size in
suburban areas has posed obstacles to desegregation. 170 Finally, the
importance of constructing some units as well as using certificates and
vouchers should be immediately apparent: the desegregation of white
neighborhoods to make all neighborhoods available to formerly ex-
cluded black public housing tenants should neither depend entirely
on a black family's success in breaking the color line nor depend on
whether they will later move to a different area for a new job or for
some other reason; rather, it is appropriate to ensure some durably
positioned housing that continues to accomplish desegregatory goals.
The intersection of race and gender: Recognizing the intersectional
interests of black women heads of low-income households would en-
first be cross-listed, so that individuals may be offered, but not penalized for
rejecting, a unit for which they did not apply. After one year, the lists will be
merged so that an applicant will be offered a range of all available desegre-
gative housing opportunities, which may include conventional public hous-
ing, Section 8 tenant based assistance, and other assisted housing units.
Each applicant will receive counseling by a nonprofit Fair Housing Services
Center ("FHSC"), created under section VII of the decree, at the time he or
she is made an offer or offers.
This section provides that the [housing authority] jurisdiction initially
will be divided into four regions so that, if an applicant is offered a desegre-
gative opportunity outside his or her home region, he or she may reject the
offer without penalty. If no desegregative opportunities are available, the
applicant will be offered other available units, but may wait for a desegrega-
tive housing opportunity. If an applicant is offered, but rejects, a desegrega-
tive housing opportunity in his or her home region, except where good
cause is shown, the applicant would move to the bottom of the waiting list.
Id. at 219.
To create even greater incentives to make desegregatory moves, it would be possible to
go further than Sanders and permit people who are willing to make desegregative moves to
select some number of locations of preference and wait until a space opens at a preferred
location.
168 For criticisms on mandatory desegregation approaches, see Calmore, FairHousing,
supra note 11; Calmore, Racialized Space, supra note 11; and Calmore, Spatial Equality, supra
note 11.
169 See, e.g., DeBolt v. Espy, 47 F.3d 777, 778-82 (6th Cir. 1995) (describing a system of
awarding contracts and incentives to produce relatively small apartments and holding that
plaintiff lacks standing because theories of incentives involved conjecture).
170 See supra text accompanying note 155.
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rich remedial planning for mobility or equalization. Martha Fineman
describes the "inevitable" dependency of childhood, old age, and ill-
ness and "derivative dependency" of caregivers. 171 Equalization reme-
dies could therefore include172 high quality child care for early
mornings and evenings that would continue through elementary
school age, better transportation between projects, access to employ-
ment, and increased ownership of automobiles if public transporta-
tion is inadequate. Mobility remedies would analyze local obstacles to
the earning power of women heads of households.173 Theories of mis-
match between skills and spatial concentration of African Ameri-
cans1 74 would have to be reevaluated in light of the market for
women's labor and discrimination against women-particularly
against black women-within labor markets.175 Given race-conscious
tools and the understanding of race as a social construction, truly
transformative remedial measures are both necessary and possible to
create.
171 FINEmAN, supra note 81, at 162-63.
172 See Koeninger, supra note 27, at 447-49 (arguing that women are sometimes disfa-
vored by the obligation to search for housing and negotiate with private landlords and that
improved public housing can meet important needs for some women).
173 For example, are these women shut out from only nearby jobs or shut out from
many otherjobs? If suburbanization is an option, which jobs might be available there? Are
there jobs near older housing projects that might be more available with more work
against discrimination, more training, more counseling, or more aggressive job placement
programs? For a discussion of gender and spatial mismatch, see Roisman, Long Overdue,
supra note 18, at 177 (citing SusAN HANSON & GERALDINE PRA-r, GENDER, WORK, AND SPACE
(1995)).
174 See, e.g., JOHN F. KAIN &JOHN M. QUIGLEY, HOUSING MARKETS AND RAcIAL DiscimI-
NATION: A MICROECONOMIC ANALYsis 87-90 (1975) (detailing the interrelationships between
the workplace and the residential choices of black workers); WILSON, supra note 120, at 42,
100-01 (emphasizing structural problems creating inner-cityjoblessness); HarryJ. Holzer &
Wayne Vroman, Mismatches and the Urban Labor Marke4 in URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB
OPPORTUNrIY 81, 82-86,89-91 (George E. Peterson & Wayne Vroman eds., 1992) (surveying
spatial mismatch literature);James H.Johnson,Jr. & Melvin L. Oliver, Structural Changes in
the U.S. Economy and Black MaleJoblessness: A Reassessment in URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB
OPPORTUNrn, supra, at 113, 113-19, 139-44 (finding that deconcentration ofjobs to subur-
ban locations diminishes employment for blacks); see also Schill, supra note 11, at 808-31
(discussing spatial mismatch arguments for deconcentration of the inner-city poor).
175 Women's decisions about moving might be based on moving out of some isolated
ghetto areas. But they might find it less important to move out of some inner cities, if
those particular urban locations had good access to work. Conversely, in some areas or for
some women, the move to suburbs might be more important. I am grateful to Florence
Roisman for pointing out that spatial mismatch theories did not consider gender. See Rois-
man, Long Overdue, supra note 18, at 176-77 (discussing the particularity of women's needs
in mobility remedies).
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IV
A WHITE FORTRESS IN THE STATE OF NATURE: PROTECTING
PRIVILEGE AGAINST CHANGE
Walker Vhas two striking qualities: first, it is so white, and, second,
it is so wrong. Section A below explains how whiteness has colored
the Supreme Court's thinking in recent cases brought by white plain-
tiffs seeking protection against structural gains made by people of
color. Walker-the Fifth Circuit case-is consistent with the identifi-
ably white thinking in recent Supreme Court cases, even though it is
doctrinally inconsistent with those cases. Section B examines the con-
cepts of whiteness and of narrow tailoring in Supreme Court opinions.
In Walker V, the Fifth Circuit refashioned narrow tailoring around a
uniquely white and illogical view of race that contradicted Supreme
Court doctrine. While it incorporated much of the worst of the
Supreme Court's thinking in positioned white terms, the Fifth Circuit
failed to reckon with the Court's repeated statements about justifica-
tions for the use of race in remedies. Section C discusses the apparent
pattern in the Rehnquist Court: whites virtually never lose on the mer-
its when challenging civil rights gains by minorities.' 7 6 This section
reviews the flawed reasoning in Walker and argues that the Supreme
Court's failure to reverse must not stamp with approval a covert rule
that "[wihite men win."177
A. Positioned White Perception in Judicial Opinions
Recent Supreme Court decisions directly restrict the remedial
powers of federal courts and adopt identifiably white views of race. In
Shaw v. Reno178 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,17 9 Justice
O'Connor called racial classifications "odious." 8 0 This is consistent
with the concept of color evasion: race is something that good white
people simply do not notice. As Frankenberg points out, however,
color evasion grows out of racism:' 8 ' noticing race is bad, because race
itself is bad-because "race" in America historically meant black/infer-
ior/subordinated/Other. If no relations of power were attached to
176 The plaintiff in Adarand would have lost under Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC 497
U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)-
Metro Broadcasting was the only case in which a white plaintiff had lost on a civil rights
challenge in the 1990s. But the Adarand Court took the case and overruled Metro Broadcast-
ing, which it had decided only five years earlier! See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing
civil rights litigation trends). Minorities frequently lost in civil rights cases during this pe-
riod, but sometimes did win. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
177 Fischl, supra note 3, at 812.
178 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
179 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
180 Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted); Shaw, 509
U.S. at 643 (internal quotation marks omitted).
181 See FRANKENBERG, supra note 68, at 20.
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race, it would not offend. Shaw and its progeny are marked by reason-
ing that is both color and power evasive. The Shaw opinion is color
evasive because, as many scholars point out,'182 districts are not suspect
when they are mostly white and are located near other whites, no mat-
ter how oddly shaped they are. Only proximity to the Other triggers
suspicion. Shaw also is power evasive it is the use of racial categories,
not the exercise of power resulting in racial subordination, that cre-
ates a constitutional violation.
Color and power evasions also mark Adarand v. Pena and City of
Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,' 8 3 the cases dealing with affirmative action
in the award of government contracts at the federal and local level.
Croson reviewed a set-aside program in the context of awarding munic-
ipal contracts.' 8 4 The Court rejected any standard of review that is
more deferential than strict scrutiny for programs in which the racial
classification at issue benefitted historically oppressed minorities. 8 5
The Court first held that strict scrutiny must be applied in reviewing
the creation of a minority set-aside program for contractors in Rich-
mond, Virginia. 8 6 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court then held that
the city had not sufficiently established a connection between actions
by the city in furtherance of public or private discrimination and the
low number of black contractors bidding on public contracts.' 8 7 By
refusing to assume that minority interest in a field will emerge in
"lockstep proportion"'88 to their presence in the population, the
Court effectively assumes that minorities do not want the same career
opportunities that whites want. 8 9
Croson is power evasive: it assumes that absent legally sufficient
proof to the contrary, white power does not reproduce itself. The
years of white-majority city government in Richmond granting virtu-
ally all city contracts to whites did not show a racial use of power to the
Court. Black power, on the other hand, is dangerous: the Court em-
phasizes the cause for concern when the new city government, which
has a bare majority of black members, enacts a set-aside program.
182 See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Rights: EvaluatingElection-District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 McH. L. REv. 483,
524-27 (1993).
183 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
184 SeeJA. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
185 See id. at 493-94.
186 See id. at 498-504.
187 See id. at 505.
188 Id. at 471.
189 The success of the "lack of interest" argument in discrimination cases has been
documented by Vicki Schultz-the willingness to attribute employment structures skewed
by race and gender to the interest levels of excluded groups. See Vicki Schultz & Stephen
Petterson, Race, Gender, Wo* and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in
Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CH. L. Rwv. 1073, 1074 (1992).
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The Adarand Court held that even the federal government could not
consider race as a category of presumptive disadvantage-even in a
program in which disadvantaged whites were eligible for affirmative
action.190 The Adarand decision, like Croson, is power evasive because
it denies the connection between minority race and the history of ex-
clusion from employment and government contracting.' 9 '
In Missouri v.Jenkins,192 the Court dealt directly with the remedial
powers of federal courts. The district court had imposed an ambitious
remedial scheme to compensate for de jure school segregation and
consequent total disrepair and decay of an urban school system.' 93
The remedy forced the state to finance a high-quality school system-
including magnet schools-and ordered ambitious measures to fi-
nance reconstruction that survived review in the Supreme Court.' 94
Several years later, when the state disputed an order to fund a pay
increase for instructional and noninstructional personnel,195 the
Supreme Court agreed to decide whether the order was within the
scope of the remedy' 96 and then struck down the remedial scheme 97
The Court asserted that tempting white students to return to the Kan-
sas City schools from other districts was as impermissible as a district
court in Detroit assuming control of more than twenty suburban
school systems in Milliken v. Bradley.198 Justice O'Connor, concurring
in Jenkins, suggested that "natural, if unfortunate, demographic
forces" may have caused departure to suburbs and racial concentra-
tion of the Kansas City school system, or that the damage might have
been caused by desegregation. 199 Both the majority and the concur-
190 See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
191 The Adarand decision is power evasive in a different sense as well: it applies the
same standard of strict scrutiny to federal and state actions taken to correct racial injustice.
192 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
193 See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 74-80.
194 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974). The original Jenkins defend-
ants included HUD and suburban school districts for their contributions to school segrega-
tion. However, the Eighth Circuit earlier held that under Milliken the suburban school
districts could not be included in the remedy. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 665
(8th Cir. 1986) (affirming the district court's dismissal of case against school district where
there was no proof of discriminatory intent in the establishment or alteration of school
district boundaries). The Supreme Court denied certiorari on most of the remedy, but
reviewed certain aspects of the district court's financial orders, striking down some and
upholding others. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
195 See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 80.
196 See id. at 84.
197 See id. at 101-02.
198 418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974). This formulation is ironic; both should have been
constitutionally permissible, but both were struck down by the Supreme Court.
199 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 111 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The district court had found
that segregation caused the harm to the schools-a holding that implicitly recognized the
social construction of race and segregation as a source of racism and fear. Justice
O'Connor, instead, looked only at white flight and thought that, absent desegregation,
flight would not have occurred.
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rences in Jenkins treated the whiteness of suburbs as natural and un-
problematic, even though only justice O'Connor used the term.
The dissents in Jenkins200 complained that the majority had effec-
tively overruled Hills v. Gautreaux,201 which had been understood to
authorize remedial actions in areas outside the boundaries within
which the segregated program had operated. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion for the majority stated that Gautreaux had not been
overruled because the case had never approved interdistrict remedies;
rather, he said, Gautreaux had held that those remedies were not im-
permissible as a matter of law, reversed the appellate court's finding
that interdistrict remedies were permissible, and remanded for the
district court's determinations. 20 2
Gautreaux recognized HUD's participation in an area-wide mar-
ket;203 proving an interdistrict violation would permit interdis-
trict remedy. But as Kenneth Casebeer points out, a belief in the mar-
ket as a natural force tends to "cure" even overtly discriminatory
past behavior.20 4  Market "cures" occur when "natural" forces
are believed to cause housing segregation, or when past discrimi-
natory state actions, are not directly related to minority contract-
ing but fall under the rubric of "societal" discrimination beyond
the reach of municipal action.20 5 Nonetheless, under these cases,
race-conscious remedy is still possible.20 6 Gautreaux is still good
200 See id. at 174-75 (Souter, J., dissenting).
201 See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 297-300 (1976).
202 See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 97-98. Peculiarly, ChiefJustice Rehnquist also distinguished
Gautreaux on the ground that it dealt with HUD rather than with a state actor. See id. at 98.
Of course, Adarand, decided at about the same time, announced as a principle of "congru-
ence" that all state, federal, and municipal actions that classify by race are to be reviewed
with strict scrutiny. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515, U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
Under Adarand, therefore, the federal government has no more power to take transforma-
tive action without being subject to strict scrutiny than do the states.
203 See Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 299.
204 See Kenneth M. Casebeer, TheEmpty State and Nobody 's Market: The Political Economy of
Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights Movemen 54 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 247, 309-10 (2000):
This is the double bind of our oppression-both the fact of injustice and
the systematic denial of responsibility for those realities oppress.... [T]he
ability to trace state responsibility and complicity disappears into Nobody's
Market, freezing the already acquired fruits of past discrimination and mak-
ing further attempts at attacking past inequality a new cost to someone else.
In effect, now all are innocents in the new regime. The Empty State par-
dons all market participants.
Id, at 310.
205 See, e.g., Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding that the Voting Rights Act
must be read in light of the strict scrutiny for all actions that classify by race and threaten-
ing to hold unconstitutional any race-conscious action).
206 See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("[W]e wish to
dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'" (citation
omitted)).
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law, and remedying racial discrimination is a permissible use of
race.207
In Walker V, the Fifth Circuit adopted a concept of race and race
neutrality that is more explicitly protective of whiteness than even the
positions taken in recent years by the Supreme Court. At the same
time, the court invented a standard for narrow tailoring that essen-
tially reads race out of remedies for past race discrimination-a posi-
tion the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected.
The Walker V opinion therefore defends whiteness when it is en-
dangered but never acknowledges the genesis of whiteness. The Fifth
Circuit acknowledged that after the end of de jure segregation the
DHA had protected white neighborhoods by avoiding construction of
any new projects. 208 However, the opinion treated the resulting white-
ness in white neighborhoods as a natural phenomenon rather than
the product of the same process that produced black concentration.
If Dallas and the DHA, assisted by the federal HUD, had not kept
black public housing tenants out of white neighborhoods, those
neighborhoods could hardly have remained all-white. In the Fifth Cir-
cuit's typically white world view, segregation means the creation of
blackness, but not the creation of protection of whiteness. Interfer-
ence with whiteness, but not the maintenance of whiteness, is con-
demned as "race"-based action. Walker manifests typically white
discomfort with the identification of whiteness as a problem. Because
the Fifth Circuit treats whiteness as a neutral, dominant norm, the
Walker V opinion is able to treat the identification of whiteness-the
classification and selection of neighborhoods by the category
"white"-as unconstitutional racial discrimination.
B. How Narrow? How Neutral?
Remedying racial discrimination is a compelling interest justify-
ing the use of race 20 9 in actions by the state.210 "[T]he nature of the
[constitutional] violation determines the scope of the remedy."211
207 See supra Part I.B (discussing justifiable use of race-conscious remedies).
208 SeeWalker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 976 (5th Cir.), reh'gdenied, 181 F.3d 98
(5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 120 S. Ct. 969 (2000).
209 The Adarand Court noted:
The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of
racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortu-
nate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to
it. As recently as 1987, for example, every Justice of this Court agreed that
the Alabama Department of Public Safety's pervasive, systematic, and obsti-
nate discriminatory conduct justified a narrowly tailored race-based
remedy.
Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted).
210 Not every current Supreme CourtJustice agrees: Justice Scalia asserts that race can-
not be used even to remedy proven past racial discrimination. See id. at 239.
211 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
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Race-conscious remedies were upheld in United States v. Paradise212
and in Hills v. Gautreaux.213 In Gautreaux, the Court found that when
"the wrong committed by HUD confined the respondents to segre-
gated public housing," it was "entirely appropriate... to order CHA
and HUD to attempt to create housing alternatives for the respon-
dents in the Chicago suburbs."214 In Adarand, Justice O'Connor went
to great lengths to establish that race-conscious remedies remain pos-
sible: "When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling
interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies
the 'narrow tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases."2 15
Could the requirement of narrow tailoring make race-neutral
measures mandatory, even when programs to remedy race discrimina-
tion were otherwise justified because of compelling state interest? If
so, the second prong of the Supreme Court's constitutional test would
then obviously swallow the first entirely. Furthermore, if this could be
the meaning of "narrowly tailored," then what would "race-neutral"
mean? The Walker court both misstated the necessity for race-neutral
measures and misunderstood the term race-neutral itself. As I will ex-
plain below, the program preferred by the Fifth Circuit in Walker Vis
not race-neutral but rather explicitly protective of whiteness.
First, it is worth noting that race-neutral measures have not
achieved desegregatory goals. An important lesson can be drawn
from the Mount Laurel cases in NewJersey.2 16 The litigation began as
a challenge to racial segregation by poor black and Hispanic plaintiffs;
but the New Jersey Supreme Court transformed it into a decision
about the rights to affordable housing for all who had difficulty paying
for relatively high-priced housing in the suburbs.21 7 After years of his-
toric litigation, new affordable housing legislation, and the construc-
tion of affordable housing, segregation still remained. Of the units
studied in the comprehensive review of implementation,218 81 per-
cent of all suburban affordable housing units are occupied by white
households, 85 percent of urban units by black or Latino house-
212 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
213 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
214 Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 299.
215 Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 237 (referring to remedies for "the practice and
the lingering effects of racial discrimination").
216 Southern Burlington County N.A.AC.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d
713 (N.J. 1975) ("Mount Laurel 1"); Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) ("Mount Laurel fl").
217 See Roisman, supra note 162, at 1387, 1391-92.
218 The units studied were those which used the state agencies for implementation.
However, there was no reason to think that more minorities would be housed in the units
not in the study. See id. at 1391.
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holds.219 Racial separation persisted regardless of class: poor whites of
any age were in the suburbs and poor people who were black or La-
tino were in the cities.220 "[T]wenty years of experience with Mount
Laurel has shown that constitutional doctrine, legislations, regulations,
and ordinances that do not mention race and ethnicity do not pro-
duce racial and ethnic desegregation."22' As Florence Roisman ar-
gues, one of the principal lessons .... is that to deal with race, courts,
legislatures, and agencies must address race, and not use income or
anything else as a proxy for race."222 Studies of Section 8 housing
around the United States published after the district court's remedial
order show that, without race-conscious intervention, Section 8 often
fails to produce desegregation. 223
The Fifth Circuit was wrong about the efficacy of non-race-
targeted measures. To strike the programs ordered by the district
court and impose its own white-protective substitute, the Fifth Circuit
had to ignore the district court's findings that the construction of
housing for the plaintiff class in white neighborhoods was necessary to
achieve desegregation. 224 It also had to distort Supreme Court
precedent.
In Croson and Adarand, the Supreme Court did not use the term
"narrow tailoring" 225 in the same context as the Fifth Circuit did in
Walker V Those opinions applied the narrow tailoring standard to leg-
islative actions in the absence of a finding of fault.2 26 The Court in
Adarand and Croson held that the programs were not narrowly tailored
to address the justification for the government action.227 The use of
race must be tailored to remedy the identified harm, and race-neutral
alternatives must have been considered before race-conscious pro-
grams were enacted. Furthermore, in Croson, the extension of relief
219 Id at 1388 (quoting NAOMI BAILIN WISH & STEPHEN EISDORFER, CENTER FOR PUBLIC
SERVICE, SETON HALL UNIv., THE IMPACr OF THE MOUNT LAUREL INITIATIVES: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF APPUCANTs AND OCCUPANTs (1996)).
220 See id. at 1391.
221 Id. at 1394.
222 Id.
223 See sources cited supra note 27.
224 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 984.
225 See Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 U.C.LA L. REV. 1781, 1791-93 (1996) (arguing
that equating the "no-less-restrictive-alternative" approach with race-neutral measures is in-
correct even in reviewing legislative decisions lacking evidence of discriminatory intent).
226 Restrictions imposed on Legal Services during the 1990s may badly hurt the reme-
dial effort in housing desegregation cases. See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Servs. Corp., 145
F.3d 1017, 1031 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding restrictions). Although Legal Services lawyers
only participated in some desegregation suits, banning the lawyers who usually know most
about housing for poor people will make it more difficult to develop the rich factual predi-
cate necessary to settle a lawsuit with a race-conscious remedy and also to assemble facts to
defend the remedy as narrowly tailored.
227 See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 236; City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989).
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to people unrelated to the plaintiff class indicated both that the pro-
gram was not narrowly tailored and that its purpose might not be truly
remedial:
If a 30% set-aside was "narrowly tailored" to compensate black con-
tractors for past discrimination, one may legitimately ask why they
are forced to share this "remedial relief" with an Aleut citizen who
moves to Richmond tomorrow? The gross overinclusiveness of
Richmond's racial preference strongly impugns the city's claim of
remedial motivation.228
Ian Ayers has recognized the Court's concern with avoiding harm
to third parties and their concern with the least restrictive measures,
but he criticized the Court's equating those issues with race-neutral
measures when reviewing legislative programs like those in Croson and
Adarand.2 29 Ayers argues that race-neutral measures may be harmful
because they can be both underinclusive and overinclusive: they are
overinclusive because they help many white businessmen who suffered
little or no competitive disadvantage under the old regime. 230 Ayers
points out that the Court also ought to fear underinclusiveness-fail-
ure to reach some people of color whose previous exclusion created
the need for these programs-if narrow tailoring is the goal.231 Obvi-
ously, underinclusiveness would undermine effective remedy. There-
fore, confusing the analysis of least restrictive measures with race-
neutral measures interferes with effective remedy. Therefore, confus-
ing the analysis of least restrictive measures with race-neutral meas-
ures interferes with effective remedy.
The only case to apply the narrow tailoring standard to judicial
decrees was United States v. Paradise, a plurality opinion in which a ma-
jority ofJustices applied the standard to a remedy for proven discrimi-
nation.2 32 In Paradise, a district court imposed a quota mandating
one-for-one promotions233 to remedy proven race discrimination
against black state troopers in Alabama. The United States appealed
228 J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506 (citations omitted).
229 See Ayres, supra note 225, at 1787 (noting that the Court's main fear in this area has
been overinclusiveness).
230 See id. Professor Ayres further noted:
If preferring the minuscule number of Aleuts in Richmond is "grossly over-
inclusive," then extending preferences to a much larger class of whites a
fortiori would fail the narrow tailoring requirement. Whites, even more
than Aleuts, are not the victims of race discrimination. Narrowly tailoring
the beneficiary class for remedial subsidies so that it will not be overinclu-
sive necessitates explicit racial classifications.
Id.
231 See id. at 1786 n.13.
232 See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 183-85 (1987).
233 After the failure of the Department of Public Safety to implement two consent
decrees to develop a promotion plan that had no adverse impact on black troopers, the
court ordered that 50% of promotions to corporal be black troopers and 50% of other
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on the grounds that the order violated the rights of white state troop-
ers. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell applied the
narrow-tailoring standard and held that it was satisfied by a temporary
one-for-one promotion quota, given the history of race discrimina-
tion.234 Justice Stevens disagreed and stated that narrow tailoring
should not be required; instead, in judicial remedies that were fash-
ioned to overcome years of resistance the courts had "broad and flexi-
ble" equitable powers. 235 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, and White stated that the order was not narrowly
tailored.2 36 Justice O'Connor stated that the plan failed to survive
strict scrutiny, because it was intended to terrorize the defendant De-
partment into adopting a plan with no adverse impact on blacks
rather than being based on any consideration of the proportionate
presence of black troopers, and because the court had not considered
alternative plans, such as appointing a trustee to design a promotion
plan to implement the consent decree or using fines to ensure com-
pliance with the consent decree.23 7
The Paradise opinions identified factors that must be reviewed to
determine whether a judicial plan to remedy race discrimination is
narrowly tailored:238
In determining whether an affirmative-action remedy is narrowly
drawn to achieve its goal, I have thought that five factors may be
relevant: (i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned
duration of the remedy; (iii) the relationship between the percent-
age of minority workers to be employed and the percentage of mi-
nority group members in the relevant population or work force; (iv)
the availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be
met; and (v) the effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties.
Based on Ayres's critique of the treatment of overinclusiveness in
Croson, however, it is possible that the Court's ultimate concern with
narrow tailoring is the final Paradise question (impact on rights of
third parties) and that the real interest of the Court with regard to
that prong lies in how a particular instance of classification affects
white people. That understanding would make Justice O'Connor's po-
high ranking positions be black troopers-as long as qualified troopers were available-
until a plan with no adverse impact was adopted. See id. at 163.
234 See id. at 177-79. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the plurality. See id. at 153.
Justice Powell concurred, while suggesting specific factors to apply in the analysis of the
narrow tailoring. See id. at 186-89 (Powell, J., concurring).
235 See id. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
236 See id. at 196-97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
237 See id. at 198-200 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
238 Id. at 187 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion outlined almost identical factors, see id. at 171, and after applying these factors,
found that the one-for-one promotion quota in Paradise was "narrowly tailored to serve its
general purpose." Id.
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sition in Croson intellectually consistent-overinclusion of whites
would effectuate the narrow tailoring if the well-being of white people
were really the point of inquiry. In a recent decision, that was pre-
cisely howJudge Richard Posner summed it up: "So the only available
justification is the remedial one, and it requires proof.., that the
remedy is narrowly tailored to the violation, which means, as a practi-
cal matter, that it discriminates against whites as little as possible con-
sistent with effective remediaion."23 9 Judge Posner is wrong to
reduce the question to impact on whites because all Paradise factors
must be weighed so that efficacy in remedy is not diminished in im-
portance, and so that whites are not casually equated with innocent
parties. However, even his formulation would not help the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Walker V, however, since Judge Posner emphasized "effective
remediation" and upheld race-based promotions-a measure far
more intrusive for affected white employees than the location of well-
designed public housing near the white Dallas homeowners. Further-
more, Judge Posner did not argue that "race neutral" measures must
be used instead of race-conscious ones when the use of race was justi-
fied as a remedy. Finally, the Fifth Circuit was wrong to equate white
homeowners, who had no identified individual roles creating segrega-
tion, with white neighborhoods whose whiteness had been protected
through segregation, as if both residents and neighborhoods could be
innocent third parties.
The district court in Walkerfaced a history of resistance to remedy
that was comparable in time to that at issue in Paradise, but involving
even more intransigent refusal to implement previous remedial agree-
ments.2 40 The court had adopted alternative plans with which the de-
fendants had not complied, and it could examine the past practice of
race-neutral measures for their effectiveness. It considered and re-
jected alternatives including reliance on Section 8 certificates alone to
accomplish desegregation.2 41 Therefore, the narrow-tailoring stan-
dards both in the Paradise dissents and plurality opinions had been
satisfied.
The Fifth Circuit claimed that it was applying the Paradise factors
but nonetheless held that the district court must attempt to use "race
239 McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998) cert. denied
(November 1998) (upholding race-based promotions in the Chicago fire department as
part of a plan to remedy proven race discrimination).
240 The segregated West Dallas project was built in 1955, Walker V, 169 F.3d at 977, 44
years before the Walker Vdecision. The first remedial consent decree was issued in 1987,
id.; the remedial order under review in Walker Vwas issued in 1997, 10 years later, id. at
978. In Paradise, resistance to remedy had continued for 11 years prior to the district
court's order, 480 U.S. at 153.
241 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 983.
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neutral" measures to remedy race discrimination.2 42 Confusion about
race-neutrality pervades the entire Walker V opinion. Bizarrely, the
Walker court calls "race neutral" a plan to give certificates to African
Americans who were victims of discrimination, even when it approves
sending these tenants to "nonblack" neighborhoods, but it calls "race-
conscious" a plan to put two small apartment complexes into white
neighborhoods. 243 By the end of Walker V, only interference with
whiteness is treated "race-conscious" remedial action. Mixing blacks
with nonpoor areas is "race-neutral." Putting black tenants into "non-
black" neighborhoods is considered race-neutral! 244 But putting them
into white neighborhoods is considered "race-conscious" and there-
fore not narrowly tailored. In Walker, interference with whiteness is "race-
consciousness" but classifying by the categories "black" or "nonblack"
is not! Ultimately, Walker Vconstitutionalizes a right in whites to pro-
tect whiteness itself against remedies for the proven race discrimina-
tion that helped create whiteness.
In Adarand, O'Connor stated that strict scrutiny, which would
now be applied to all race-conscious state actions, need not inevitably
be fatal.2 4 5 The parallel to Adarand's concept of race neutrality would
be a program enacted without a finding of past discrimination that
would assist public housing residents without regard to their race or
move all residents of any race into neighborhoods chosen without
considering race. The district court had found after extensive exami-
nation that race-targeted remedies were needed to achieve the gov-
ernment's compelling interest in redressing proven race
discrimination.2 46
The Walker V court's concept of "race-neutrality" is actually the
opposite of the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Croson and
Adarand. Those decisions concerned the award of assistance to bene-
ficiaries chosen on the basis of race in the absence offindings of discrimi-
nation and struck down the grant of particular benefits to minorities
on the basis of race.2 4 7 In Walker, the plaintiff class was black and,
under the remedial scheme that the Walker court seems to approve,
benefits would flow to black tenants and applicants. Therefore, the
remedy is clearly race-conscious under Croson and Adarand.
In Walker V, narrow tailoring was interpreted to mean that even
when a remedy must be race-conscious because a race-based plaintiff class has
242 See id. at 988.
243 See id. at 982.
244 See Ely, supra note 60, at 585 n.33 (comparing "[b]lack/non-black" with "white/
non-white" as racial classifications).
245 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
246 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 978.
247 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213; City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 480
(1989).
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shown systematic harm on the basis of race, every aspect of the remedy-
recipient of benefits, manner of relief, and so on-must attempt to be
race-neutral. In this interpretation, the underlying meaning of "nar-
rowly tailored to address a compelling government interest" is written
out of the law. Whites, who have most to gain from retaining the sta-
tus quo, will benefit most if race is removed from every remedial provi-
sion. In cases like Croson and Adarand, at least some whites will receive
benefits if the award of business contracts is based on small size or
disadvantage rather than minority race. In cases like Walker, fewer
whites will be impacted by a remedial plan that was purportedly
designed to remedy the process of exclusion from white areas. There-
fore, all Walker V achieves is the protection of whites from interfer-
ence with the whiteness of their environment-at least when that
interference is made on the basis of race!
Ultimately, Walker V states a position that reflects uniquely white
logic. Remedies that classify by race are justified if they serve a com-
pelling governmental interest, such as remedying proven racial dis-
crimination. But to meet the narrow-tailoring standard, they must
attempt to avoid using race as a classification in any possible aspect of
remedy. Therefore, under the logic of Walker V, the only acceptable
way to use race is not to use race! This position only makes sense as a
manifestation of white discomfort with the concept of race and white
insistence on perceiving whiteness as natural.
C. Under-Ruling Civil Rights
White plaintiffs challenging civil rights gains reached a watershed
in 1989, when the Supreme Court decided Martin v. Wls 248 and City
of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. 249 After 1987, the year of the Paradise
decision, I found fourteen cases in which white plaintiffs brought such
challenges to the Supreme Court.250 Whites won outright in nine:
Martin v. Wilks, 2 5 1 City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,2 52 Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Slater ("Adarand Yl,),253 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
248 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
249 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
250 I ran searches for a "white and race" and "Caucasian and race" to get post-Paradise
cases on LEXIS and Westlaw and then eliminated cases that dealt with jury selection, that
were brought by minority plaintiffs, that turned up simply because Justice White was still on
the Court, or that were otherwise unrelated to this research. For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on civil rights of racial minorities, see generally
GiRARADEAu A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN
CoNTEMpoRAR.Y AMEsmcA (1993).
251 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (upholding the right to intervene to challenge consent
decree).
252 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to local affirmative action program
that classified by race).
253 120 S. Ct. 722 (2000).
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Pena ("Adarand r'),254 Bush v. Vera,255 Shaw v. Hunt ("Shaw Ir'),256
Miller v. Johnson,257 Shaw v. Reno ("Shaw 1"),258 and Northeastern Florida
Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Jackson-
ville ("Jacksonville Contractors").259 The only white plaintiff to fail sub-
stantively in a challenge to gains for minorities in the Supreme
Court-the plaintiff in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, Inc.260-was vindicated
retrospectively when that case was overruled in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena.261
In four cases, whites did not win outright in the Supreme Court;
but in three of these, whites did not really lose, either. In Hunt v.
Cromartie,262 summary judgment had been granted below in favor of
white plaintiffs challenging the congressional district in North Caro-
lina that had been redrawn after the Shaw cases. The Supreme Court
held that triable issues existed as to whether the legislature's motive
was impermissibly racial; racial motive would not be presumed from
the shape of the district when motive was disputed.2 63 The Supreme
Court reversed the summary judgment, 64 but the Court expressed no
opinion on whether the white plaintiffs would ultimately prevail at
trial. In Lawyer v. DOJ,2 6 5 white plaintiffs had challenged redistricting
in court and succeeded in obtaining a settlement, but one plaintiff
was dissatisfied with the relief they had won.2 66 The Supreme Court
held that the district court had not been erroneous in approving the
254 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to federal government affirmative ac-
tion program that considered race as a presumptive factor showing disadvantage).
255 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (involving a situation in which not all plaintiffs were white, but
the challenged districts benefitted African Americans).
256 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
257 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
258 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
259 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
260 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overru/ed by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995).
261 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
262 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
263 See id. at 548-49.
264 See id. at 554.
265 521 U.S. 567 (1997).
266 See id. at 569. The Lauer opinion does not refer to Lawyer's race. Lawyer was "a
white ... lawyer." Editorial, Confusion Reigns, ST. P=ERSBURG TIMEs, July 2, 1997, at 14A; see
also Larry Dougherty, Court Upholds Hargrett's Distric4 ST. PETFMRBURG TiMisS, June 26, 1997,
at 1B (describing Martin Lawyer as a "self-described 'aging liberal' and legal aid lawyer who
nevertheless thought that Florida's effort to elect minority legislators had gone too far").
Intervention was permitted by several parties including both houses of the Florida
legislature and black and Hispanic residents of the challenged district. All parties reached
a settlement and the districts were redrawn. Only Lawyer tried to appeal the result. See
Lawyer, 521 U.S. at 572.
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settlement to Lawyer's lawsuit.2 67 In United States v. Hays,2 68 the dis-
trict court struck down the mostly minority districts on Hays's chal-
lenge; the court struck them down again with a different group of
plaintiffs, including Hays, after the Supreme Court held that Hays and
the original plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not live in the
mostly minority district-the real subject of the challenge. 269
Arguably, the only real loser during this whole period was Fran-
cois Daniel Lesage, "an African immigrant of Caucasian descent"270
who sued the University of Texas after being denied admission to a
graduate program in an admissions process which he alleged consid-
ered race.271 Because the admissions criteria placed Lesage lower
than many other applicants and his recommendations were weak, he
had been rejected relatively early when the pool was narrowed to forty
applicants for twenty spaces.272 The Supreme Court held in a per
curiam decision that the government could defeat liability by demon-
strating that it would have made the same decision absent the consid-
eration of race,273 even though the injury was "the inability to
compete on an equal footing."274 However, even Lesage's loss is
somewhat qualified. The University of Texas had apparently stopped
using a race-based admissions policy after Hopwood v. Texas,2 75 Le-
sage's case was remanded because the possibility of injunctive relief
had not been considered separately from his claim for damages below
and because he had raised other claims.2 76 Apparently, if Texas had
not discontinued race-conscious admissions Lesage's claim for injunc-
tive relief might have continued.
Of course, the triumphant procession of white plaintiffs in the
Supreme Court cannot establish the total protection of whites-a
complete assessment would require examining all cases in which re-
view was denied as well as those taken by the Court for considera-
tion.27 7 But Walker Vwas a case that needed reversal: its reasoning is
267 See Lawyer, 521 U.S. at 578.
268 515 U.S. 737 (1995). Like Lawyer, the Hays opinion is so coy about race that the
plaintiff's race is never mentioned-he was white. SeeJ. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND
INJUSTICE: MINORIY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION
407-09 (1999).
269 See Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1996) (recounting background of
litigation and finding new redistricting scheme unconstitutional).
270 Texas v. Lesage, 120 S. Ct. 467, 467 (1999) (per curiam).
271 See id. (reversing per curiam appellate court's reversal of summary judgment for
defendant University of Texas).
272 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
273 See Lesage, 120 S. Ct. at 468.
274 Id.
275 78 F.d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
276 See Lesage, 120 S. Ct. at 469.
277 This Article does not attempt a comprehensive review of all cases in which the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. See supra note 3.
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different than that of any other case on housing remedies; its citations
to other cases reveal profound confusion over the meaning of race-
consciousness and race-neutrality; and its mistaken view of narrow tai-
loring threatens to effectively eliminate the use of race in plans to
remedy race discrimination. 278 No matter why the Supreme Court
chose to deny review,279 allowing the Walker V decision to stand was
both wrong and dangerous.
In addition to the mistakes about the application of the narrow-
tailoring requirement, the Walker V opinion by Judge Edith Jones
manifested great confusion about the meaning of race-consciousness
when citing other cases. The Walker V opinion cites the Birmingham
case 280 as demonstrating progress achieved "without the use of a race-
conscious remedy. '281 The Birmingham case, however, explains that,
after an affirmative action ordinance was vetoed by the Mayor,282 "a
subsequent measure was enacted which placed responsibility on vari-
ous department heads to set and achieve minority employment
goals. ' 28 3 A plan that has department heads "set and achieve minority
employment goals"2 84 is clearly race-conscious. The distinction being
drawn by the Birmingham court was that there was no quota involved,
not that the plan was not race-conscious. 285 Again, Judge Jones mis-
understood race consciousness in her reference to the Yonkers litiga-
tion, which she described as "using a geographical site selection
criterion for public housing."286 The cited page does refer to the re-
278 The Court could also have reviewed Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), and Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 150 F.3d 438 (5th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1038 (1999), but did not. In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit
held that Regents of University v. Bakke had not survived Adarand, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940. In Dallas Fire Fighters the Fifth Circuit struck down a race-based
promotions plan after it was challenged by white and Native American plaintiffs. See Dallas
Fire Fighters, 150 F.3d at 443. For the Dallas Fire Fighters case, two justices dissented from the
denial of certiorari. See City of Dallas v. Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n, 526 U.S. 1046 (1999)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
279 The Department ofJustice had supported the plaintiffs at the motion for rehearing
but opposed the petition for certiorari, arguing, inter alia, that although the Walker deci-
sion was wrong, it did not entirely rule out all possibility of race-based remedies if the
district court examined further alternatives on remand. Brief for Respondent at 19, Walker
V (No. 99-296).
280 See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 20 F.3d 1525
(11th Cir. 1994).
281 Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 984 n.27 (5th Cir. 1999). The opinion
has no pin cite for the proposition that this progress was "without... a race-conscious
remedy." Id.
282 See 20 F.3d at 1546.
283 Id.
284 1&
285 The court noted that "the City had implemented effective alternatives to race-based
quotas to remedy its prior discriminatory behavior." Id.
286 Walker V, 169 F.3d at 985 (citing United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d
1181, 1184, 1236-37 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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quirement that public housing be placed outside Southwest Yonkers;
but previously the same opinion had described the remedial locations
for public housing as being in "nonminority" areas,287 which clearly
refers to areas that were neither black nor Hispanic but white. 288
The Walker V opinion suggests that when a defendant begins co-
operating with remedy after years of resistance this will render race-
conscious relief unnecessary.289 Under the Walker theory, any govern-
mental entity could discriminate at will for many years and still could,
at the very last moment, switch to compliance with antidiscrimination
laws and remedial orders and thereby avoid having its previous dis-
crimination undone through race-targeted relief. This is inconsistent
with Paradise and would make remedial orders virtually impossible,
since they could be obviated by the last-minute position shifts by
defendants.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit manifested a paradigmatically white view
of housing choices in Walker V, stating that with Section 8 certificates
"market forces and personal preferences" can guide "the homemak-
ing decision."290 The court treated as inconsequential the district
court's finding that some tenants prefer not to have Section 8 certifi-
cates, as a justification for making available some unit-based aid! Of
course, in this view, "market forces and personal preferences" 291 lead
to freedom rather than confinement. This is a white view because it
discounts the experience of people of color, which is often to the con-
trary. Furthermore, the court treated the expressed personal prefer-
ences without weight. Meaningful personal preferences are those
achieved without public housing-the way many white people would
prefer the choices to be made-rather than preferences some mem-
bers of the plaintiff class expressed to the district court. Taken to-
gether, Walker creates dangerous doctrine, inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's holdings on race-conscious remedies. The explicit
and implicit protection of whites and whiteness in Walker merited re-
view and reversal, and its confusion about race consciousness and nar-
row tailoring should not be adopted by other courts.
CONCLUSION
Are white neighborhoods segregated? Plainly, the Walker Vcourt
thought not. The court apparently believed that segregation meant
287 See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1183-84.
288 See id. at 1226 (discussing necessity of grouping blacks and Hispanics together as
minorities in Yonkers).
289 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 985 (describing the city of Dallas as a cooperating defen-
dant and contrasting with the defendant's resistance in Paradise)
290 Id. at 988.
291 Id.
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blackness, and that "race-consciousness" meant bringing blackness
into whiteness. These perspectives are uniquely white ways of looking
at race and segregation. It is not surprising that their application to
the facts in Walker had the result of protecting white privilege. These
perspectives are not inevitable, however. The narrow-tailoring doc-
trine cannot be permitted to constitutionalize white concepts of race-
neutrality in a way that shields whiteness from transformation.
The Walker Vcourt missed the real issue: Too much whiteness is a
social problem. The linkage between blackness, poverty, and concen-
tration is part of the same process that linked whiteness, privilege, and
exclusion. Mandatory desegregation of white neighborhoods is the
solution. The real point of remedy should be transforming the social
construction of race as well as the geography of metropolitan areas.
Housing segregation affects popular concepts of employment and em-
ployability, of education and community, and of the nature and needs
of female-headed households. We need creative scope in housing
remedies and attention to the multiple harms segregation has
wrought. Rather than viewing concepts of whiteness as natural, reme-
dies for public housing segregation should reveal and end the mecha-
nisms that have created and reproduced racial exclusion and
subordination.
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